KOSOVO-METOHIJA - POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM

Slobodan Samardzic

Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, June 1995.

Kosovo-Metohija is one of the major enduring crisis spots in the Balkans. The name of this province in Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has become a negative symbol of the still unresolved Serbian-Albanian dispute. There have been latent or manifest conflicts between the two peoples throughout the 20th century. As the end of this century draws near, the potential of the Serbian-Albanian conflict is increasing, indicating clearly that problems have accumulated instead of being resolved. The current state of "neither war nor peace", with extremely unfavorable internal and external determinants, does not promise the beginning of an irreversible and lasting peaceful resolution. The problem is so sensitive politically that any, however well-meaning, peace proposal easily produces effects totally contrary to the desired ones. There seems to be no solution for Kosovo-Metohija. All the approaches - practical-political as well as intellectual, are faced with the damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you- don't dilemma. Therefore, the author of this paper is fully aware of its limitations.

Given the nature of the problem, this paper must have quite modest goals. It will present the problem as it appears on its visible political level. Being a part of a collective engagement, the paper is limited by the topics of the other papers: a presentation of the Albanian political scene in Kosovo-Metohija, the constitutional-legal aspect of the problem and the human rights dimension. In other words, the paper will present only official Serbian politics and the opposition scene: the views and policies of government bodies in Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the programs of the opposition parties and associations in Serbia and, finally, one more advanced individual project. Realistic solutions to the problem and their probable political consequences will be presented at the end of the paper.

1. The approach and policy of government bodies in Serbia and the FRY

We will not delve into the history of the Serbian-Albanian conflict as regards Kosovo-Metohija because such an approach would lead us to the unanswerable question of the beginning of the conflict. We will focus on the period from 1990 onward, as it seems sufficient for presenting the current state of the problem in light of the subject of this paper. In 1990 political pluralism became legal in all Yugoslav republic. This process was paralleled by an accelerated disintegration of the federal state. The manifest Serbian-Albanian conflict, which had begun in 1981, gradually merged into the general interethnic conflict within the federation as a whole.

After the passing of the amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, whereby its constituent provinces were stripped of their constitutional power, while their legislative, administrative and judiciary powers were curtailed (28 March 1989), the authorities in Serbia tried to resolve the problem of Serbia's southern province by presenting it as a matter of the legislative and executive- administrative activities of Serbia's legal bodies. The normative- institutional goals were to bring the provinces back into Serbia's state framework as equal federal units and to redefine their constitutional status by giving them the usual territorial and political autonomy, such as they had from 1946 to 1968-1971. The political goal of these activities was to prevent Kosovo's secession and help the gradual return of Serbs to the province. The republic assumed the powers which should ensure the achievement of these goals - in the areas of public security, law, economic policy and regional planning - as well as some powers in the areas of education, media activity and health care.

The Albanian population, organized as an all-encompassing national movement, strongly resisted these actions by Serbia's government bodies. Since 1990 the centre of this resistance has been the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), founded late in 1989. Albanians expressed their opposition to changes in the province's constitutional status through numerous protests, demonstrations, strikes and individual acts of violence in 1989 and 1990, trying to win the status of a republic for Kosovo, as a further radicalization of the province's constitutional status even in comparison to the 1974 Constitution. On the other hand, the process of redefining Kosovo- Metohija's constitutional and legal status was accompanied by strong police and legal repression by the Serbian state.

One of the key state documents from this period was the Programme for Achieving Peace, Freedom, Equality and Prosperity in Kosovo, adopted by the Serbian Parliament on 22 March 1990. In the name of its basic goal - the peaceful coexistence of all ethnic groups living in Kosovo (the document mentions Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, Muslims, Croats, Turks and Romanies), while specifying Albanian separatism as the main threat to that goal, the Programme announced "specific measures for preserving law and order, peace, freedom, equality and Serbia's integrity". The Programme defined the problem of individual and ethnic rights as having three main aspects: guaranties of human rights for all of Kosovo's citizens; full equality for the Albanians, including the right to foster their national tradition, religion and cultural heritage; and the right to and the creation of conditions for the settling in Kosovo of Serbs and Montenegrins forced to leave the province earlier and of all those willing to live and work there. The Programme was followed by a 95-item Plan of Operations for the Fulfillment of the Programme Tasks*.

There were neither political nor financial conditions for an effective implementation of this Programme. The Albanian side did not accept the authority and legitimacy of its very propounder. Furthermore, it was the time when the rift between the two ethnic communities in Kosovo reached its apex. The Albanians' refusal to recognize the legitimacy and legality of the Serbian state in Kosovo led straight to the establishment of a parallel Albanian body politic. On 2 July 1990, Albanian deputies in Kosovo's parliament passed a Constitutional Declaration on the Republic of Kosovo. The Serbian Parliament responded by dissolving Kosovo's Parliament on 5 July. This decision was supported by the Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) at its session on 11 July. This was followed by a mass strike of Albanians, which grew into a general strike on 3 September. On 7 September, the Albanian deputies in the dissolved Kosovo Parliament promulgated the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo in Kacanik.

Serbian authorities responded to these illegal separatist activities of the Albanian national movement and to the major disruption of Kosovo's economy, education and the media by taking repressive legal action. The Law on the Action of Republican Bodies in Special Circumstances made it possible to take emergency measures in the public services sector. Application of such measures began in the economy, health care, education, the legal system and administration in Kosovo on 1 July 1990. Ethnic Albanian company managers and directors of public institutions were fired en masse. Workers began leaving these companies and institutions, and pupils and students began boycotting classes in the academic year 1990-1991. At the same time, the Albanians established parallel educational and health care systems, media and economic activity.

The new constitutional status of Serbia's two provinces was defined by the Serbian Constitution adopted on 28 September 1990. The provinces (the Constitution specifically mentions Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija) were given the usual characteristics of a territorial and political autonomy, with their own statutes, parliaments elected in general elections, and executive and administrative bodies (Articles 108-112). Members of ethnic minorities were guaranteed the following collective rights: the right to official use of their mother tongue (Article 1, Paragraph 2); the right to being educated in their mother tongue (Article 32, Paragraph 3); and freedom of religion (Article 41).

As for Kosovo-Metohija, the Albanians' stand is opposed to this constitutional solution in two ways: formal and concrete. The formal side of the problem concerns the fact that Kosovo's closely-knit Albanian majority did not participate, through its elected representatives, in the creation of the Constitution and therefore those of its articles governing the province's constitutional status and the status of the Albanian ethnic community within that framework. The concrete deficiency of Kosovo's new constitutional status concerns the compact political will of the Albanians to turn the province into a state of their own and place it out of the scope of Serbia's authority. In accordance with this fundamental views, Albanian political parties in Kosovo did not take part in any of the elections held in Serbia and the FRY (in 1990, 1992 and 1993), and the Albanian population boycotted all the elections in great numbers. Kosovo's government bodies compatible with the Constitution have never been elected or established, so that authority in the province is directly exercised by Serbia's government bodies. This practice is quite in keeping with the application of emergency measures in many areas of life and with the parallel (illegal) institutionalization of political, economic, health-care, media and educational activities which is being carried out by the Albanian ethnic community.

The five years of the activity of Serbia's government bodies in Kosovo-Metohija have been very unfavorable in terms of the goals of the constitutional changes undertaken and the legislative and administrative activity of the state. Today the Albanian secessionist policy is as firm as five years ago. In September 1991, the Albanians held an illegal referendum on "a sovereign and independent state of Kosovo". In May 1992 they held illegal parliamentary and presidential elections and formed a government. The Serbs continue to leave the province, and their trust in the measures undertaken by republican and federal authorities is rapidly diminishing. The extremely unfavorable economic situation in the country, aggravated by the international community's sanctions, is drastically reducing the possibility of making investments the purpose of which should be the creation of conditions (housing, land, employment) for the return of Serbs to the province. These measures, which are being carried out by federal and republican government bodies (e.g. the Law on Acquisition of Flats for the Return of Persons Forced to Leave Kosovo-Metohija of 17 March 1994 and the decisions which followed it) have failed to produce the expected results. No ethnic group living in Kosovo-Metohija, including Albanians and Serbs, is satisfied. The two communities live side by side in a state of open hostility, without any communication. The state's repressive measures can only help maintain the status quo of "neither peace nor war".

Education is the only area in which representatives of the government bodies of Serbia and the FRY have been in direct contact with Albanian representatives in an effort to resolve problems through talks. The breakdown in relations between the Albanians on one hand and Serbia and the FRY on the other and their decision to lead a separate existence, with Kosovo-Metohija's secession from Serbia as their ultimate goal, have affected education most drastically. Serbia's constitutional and legal decisions mentioned above have also been aimed at establishing a unified education system on Serbia's entire territory.

Before the 1989 constitutional changes, the provinces were completely independent in their education policy. After the changes, unified regulations were applied in the area of education in all of Serbia. Article 32, Paragraph 4, of the Serbian Constitution guarantees "members of other nationalities and ethnic groups the right to be educated in their own mother tongue, in accordance with the law". Similar to this provision is Article 46, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the FRY: "Members of ethnic minorities have the right to be educated in their own mother tongue, in accordance with the law. Before the academic year 1990-1991, primary education in Kosovo- Metohija was provided by 964 schools in three languages - Serbian, Albanian and Turkish. Classes in Albanian were attended by 304,836 pupils, in Serbian by 42,388 pupils and in Turkish by 1,890 pupils. Secondary education was provided by 83 high schools for 69,221 Albanian, 14,678 Serbian and 389 Turkish pupils. Two-year post- secondary and University education was provided by six two-year post- secondary schools and 13 University schools for 6,960 Albanian, 2,322 Serbian and 26 Turkish students.

The Albanians' resistance to the transfer of authority in the area of education from the provinces to the republic was part of the general Serbian-Albanian state dispute. Their refusal to accept the status of an ethnic minority also resulted in their rejection of the guaranteed ethnic minority rights in the area of education. Despite the relatively high degree of autonomy in this area, which did not manifest itself only in the right to be educated in one's mother tongue but also in their participation in drawing up the curricula for specific subjects (mother tongue, history, geography, art), the Albanians once again insisted on Kosovo's statehood as the source of their sovereign rights. The problem manifested itself most clearly in the drawing up of the curricula. The Albanians' intention to preserve their complete autonomy in the area of education met with vehement opposition from Serbia's government bodies, which allowed only relative autonomy to Kosovo's educational authorities. The result of the dispute was the same as in other social services: temporary emergency measures were instituted in Kosovo's schools; its education authorities were suspended, Albanian teachers were removed from schools and the University, and Albanian pupils and students boycotted classes and the entire education process. Since the academic year 1990-1991, a parallel illegal Albanian educational system has been in existence, operating partly in existing school buildings (primary schools), but mostly in private houses. Over 300,000 Albanian pupils and students are attending this illegal instruction, getting diplomas with the "Republic of Kosovo" seal on them.

In the second half of 1992 and the first half of 1993 an effort was made at resolving at least the problem of education in Kosovo- Metohija. The initiative was launched by the Federal Government, which on 10 September 1992 adopted a Programme for Resolving Problems in the Education and Culture of the Albanian Minority in Kosovo-Metohija. The Programme, drawn up in cooperation with Serbia's education authorities, specified the following measures: 1) resolving the pressing problems in education - reestablishing regular Albanian- language instruction, getting Albanian teachers back to work, reaching agreement on the previous two academic years, which were not regular; 2) respecting the specific cultural elements of the Albanians in the curricula; 3) improving the quality of education and developing intercultural cooperation. In addition to these specific educational elements, the Programme also contained a number of proposals aimed at resolving complex problems such as: the unfreezing of the media, intelculturalism (establishing experimental bilingual classes), professional training of adults, education of the population for living in a plural society, instruction in the Albanian language abroad, cooperation between schools in Kosovo and other parts of the country, cooperation of Albanian representatives in the drawing up of the Law on Ethnic Minorities, etc.

Cooperation was offered to Albanian representatives on the basis of this Programme, with the cooperation of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. A special Subgroup for Problems in Education was set up as part of the Working Group of the Conference on Human and Minority Rights. Its members included representatives of the FRY and Serbian Governments, the Albanian minority and ambassador Gerd Ahrens on behalf of the Geneva Conference.

From October 1992 to June 1993 the Subgroup for Problems in Education worked with more or less success, but with no result in the end. Although it was initially agreed that problems in education should be resolved without addressing the political issues, it was the politicization of problems in Kosovo's education system that led to the failure. At the first meeting of the Subgroup, held in Prishtina on 13 and 14 October 1992, it was agreed in principle that a step-by- step approach should be taken (first the problems in primary education were to be resolved, then those in secondary education, and finally those at the University). At the very next meeting, held in Belgrade on 22 October, the Albanian side insisted on dealing with all the problems at once, as part of the restitution of the educational system on the basis of the 1974 Constitution. Albanian representatives did not even show up at the next meeting of the Subgroup held on 11 November in Novi Sad, as on this occasion the educational problems of other ethnic minorities in the FRY were also discussed, and the Albanians did not accept the constitutional status of an ethnic minority. The Serbian Government refused to send delegates to the next two meetings, which were to be held in Geneva, because the Serbian leadership saw this as the beginning of an internationalization of the Kosovo issue. The Subgroup was closest to a compromise at the meeting held in Geneva on 7 and 8 April 1993 and attended by all of its members. The FRY Government's proposal consisted of a number of items:

1) Accepting the curricula for instruction in the Albanian language adopted in 1990 (before the emergency measures were taken) as a starting point, because of all the existing versions these curricula allowed for the highest degree of autonomy for the Albanians.

2) Reemploying all the teachers who taught Albanian children before the disruption of the education system, except for the few who had fallen foul of the law to a significant degree and for whom the Serbian Government could provide specific explanations.

3) Recognizing the continuity of education and scores of the pupils attending classes in the Albanian parallel education system. This referred to all the levels of education in the Albanian language.

4) All the proposed solutions were of a temporary nature, until the final normalization of the situation in the province.

The Albanian side made its acceptance of this initial solution conditional on the return of pupils and students into school buildings and on a number of procedural issues. Its demands were basically of a political nature: they refused to accept the authority of the Republic of Serbia in the area of education in the Albanian language, demanded more autonomy than given by the Constitution to other ethnic minorities in the FRY, and constantly mixed educational and political issues, making new demands once agreement had been reached.

The failure to reach a compromise in the area of education illustrates the scope and depth of the Serbian-Albanian dispute and the impossibility of a dialogue at this level of political representation (official government bodies of Serbia and the FRY vs. Albanian legitimate representatives, with the mediation of international representatives). The depth of the problem is also indicated by the fact that at the time the members of the Federal Government were not controlled by Serbia's political leadership and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in particular. This fact made the Serbian-Albanian dialogue possible in the first place because the Federal Government representatives were ready for a compromise and concessions. Their programmes and specific proposals showed their willingness to agree to the highest possible educational autonomy for the Albanians. The other two sides - the Serbian Government representatives and the Albanian representatives - were much less flexible, so that after the fall of the Federal Government in April 1993 everything was as it had been in the beginning.

In the past five years this has been the only example of direct talks between the Serbian and Albanian sides concerning a specific problem. After this failure, education and all other areas of life remained divided into two parallel worlds, one belonging to the legal system of government, and the other to an illegal system for organizing all aspects of life. Intolerance and open hostility between these two worlds has been increasing, and so has the potential for conflict and repression.

2. The views of political parties and associations in Serbia

It is possible to outline a possible alternative policy towards Kosovo-Metohija - and the Albanian question in particular -in Serbia on the basis of the views stated in the programmes of opposition parties and associations. The most important limitation concerns the usual differences between programmes and practical politics. True to form, this difference is most visible in the case of the ruling party because its political score in Kosovo-Metohija can be clearly presented simply because this party carries out the state policy and is solely responsible for its results. In the case of opposition parties, we can only assume, with a low degree of probability, what kind of policy they would be carrying out, in light of their programmes and political views, especially in the case of a political problem as complex as Kosovo-Metohija. That is why we can discuss here only the outline of a possible alternative policy in Serbia to be carried out by other parties on assuming power.

We will begin this presentation with the views stated in the programme of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), although the results achieved by the SPS were already presented in the first section of this paper. The SPS is solely responsible for the results of the Government's policy towards Kosovo-Metohija, all the more so since so far there has not been even a minimum of consensus on this problem - or on any other problem for that matter - in Serbia in terms of programmes and methods for carrying out ethnic policy. The views stated in the programme of the SPS are presented here for two reasons: first, in order to represent the views of all the major political parties; and second, in order to draw a clear line between the programmes and the results achieved, since this conceals a latent danger for all those political protagonists who, struggling for power, inevitably come to reexamine their own political principles and competence.

In analyzing the programmes of different political parties, a formal identity becomes obvious - all the parties treat the issue of rights and freedoms on three different levels. On one level, they speak of the same basic rights and freedoms, which are equally guaranteed to all citizens regardless of their nationality, religion or political affiliation. On another level, they speak of certain specific rights, notably of the rights of ethnic collectives (ethnic minorities), which are guaranteed in accordance with well-known international standards. Finally, they speak specifically of the Albanian ethnic minority and often of Kosovo-Metohija in this context, repeating and confirming their views on special collective rights.

Bearing this in mind, we will leave out the first level of this treatment of rights and freedoms, simply because there are no significant differences between the programmes of different parties in this respect. Differences appear, more or less, on the second and third levels, i.e. in proposals for the resolution of specific ethnic minority problems.

The Programme of the SPS, adopted at its Second Congress on 23 and 24 October 1995, expressly upholds the exercise of the collective rights of ethnic minorities. This is specified as the party's endorsement of cultural and not (expressly) political autonomy. The Programme states that ethnic minorities must be politically represented, especially in bodies of government and local government. However, as this view is not further elaborated on, we can only guess that the SPS endorses some form of overproportional representation of ethnic minorities in bodies of government. (As only local government is explicitly mentioned, it is not clear which level or branch of government the Programme refers to.)

The Programme provides a criterion for differentiating between "peoples" and "ethnic minorities". This is a concept applied throughout Yugoslavia's entire constitutional practice since the end of World War Two. Those ethnic groups with mother countries outside Yugoslavia do not have the right to self-determination up to and including the right to secession; this right belongs only to the "constituent peoples", i.e. to the Serbs and Montenegrins. Nothing is expressly said about the constitutional status of peoples "constituent" before the breakup of Yugoslavia (Croats, Muslims, Macedonians and Slovenes), whose members still live in the FRY. It can be assumed that after the establishment of their nation states, the criterion for differentiating between "peoples" and "ethnic minorities" automatically applies to them as well. On the other hand, the Serbs outside the FRY, in areas where they are in a majority, i.e. where they have formed states of their own - the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Serb Republic - also have the right to self- determination as the Serbs and Montenegrins in the FRY. They are thus institutionally allowed to join the FRY. (This is also a possibility according to Article 2, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the FRY.)

The Programme also mentions autonomous provinces. It says that they cannot be states but can only have territorial autonomy, for which the Serbian Constitution guarantees those rights expressive of the specific ethnic, historical and cultural traits of the areas in which they were formed. The Programme also contains a special section on the resolution of the crisis in Kosovo-Metohija as one of the autonomous provinces. It stresses that Kosovo-Metohija is an integral part of Serbia, with immense political and symbolic significance for the Serbian people. The Albanians, although in a majority in the province, cannot have other status than that enjoyed by other ethnic minorities, which means that they have all the political and cultural rights established in the international practice of treating ethnic minority issues. Specifically, this means the following rights: 1) the right to use one's own mother tongue and be educated in one's own mother tongue; 2) the right to foster cultural tradition and develop relevant institutions, cultural societies and publishing companies; 3) the right to publish newspapers in one's own mother tongue; 4) freedom of religion; 5) the right to form political parties, associations and clubs; 6) the right to promote one's own ideas; 7) the right to participate in elections; 8) the right to participate in the work of the republican and federal parliaments. The Programme underscores that the problem does not lie in the rights of the Albanians but in their failure to recognize the state they live in, its Constitution and the laws guaranteeing them these rights. The Programme also emphasizes the willingness of the SPS to engage in a dialogue about all the problems concerning the rights of the Albanians, as well as other ethnic minorities in Serbia.

As far as Kosovo-Metohija is concerned, the Programme stresses the need for the Serb and Montenegrins who were forced to leave Kosovo to return there as well as for anyone willing to settle in Kosovo to do so. This would redress the historical wrong done to the Serbs, whose departure from the province was the result of real ethnic cleansing carried out earlier by Albanian authorities.

These views stated in the programme of the SPS are also the official vies of government bodies in Serbia and the FRY on this problem. Even before the Programme was adopted, these views became part of the normative system of Serbia and the federal state and the constitutional and legal basis for the activity of government bodies in Kosovo-Metohija. This normative system, at least as far as the rights and freedoms of the Albanians are concerned, has been suspended for several years now, and practical politics in the province have next to nothing in common with the SPS's position as stated in its Programme.

The Programme of the Democratic Party (DS), adopted at its latest congress in April 1995, mentions Kosovo-Metohija in its section entitled "A Single Ethnic Policy". Special attention, it is said, needs to be paid to this problem in Serbia and the FRY, because this province has been abandoned by the Serbian state, while the Albanian separatists are achieving their goals. It is estimated that, given the situation, it is high time the Serbian state tried, by all means available to a state, to preserve Kosovo-Metohija as an area where Serbs and Albanians, as well as members of other nationalities, live side by side. The Programme says that Kosovo-Metohija must develop and be reintegrated into Serbia politically, economically, culturally and demographically, and that its specific characteristics must be respected.

As for the rights of members of ethnic minorities, the DS, according to its Programme, stands for the exercise of specific rights of ethnic minorities, such as the right to culture, freedom of religion, the right to one's own mother tongue, the right to form ethnic associations, the right to have media organizations in one's own mother tongue, and the special concern of the state over the protection and promotion of ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity. The Programme particularly stresses the importance of the participation of ethnic minorities in making decisions on issues of consequence to them, in accordance with the law. On the other hand, the Programme expressly states that the question of ethnic minority rights must not be linked to territorial autonomy, i.e. that the essence of the issue is contained in the individual and collective rights of members of ethnic minorities and the legal protection of these rights. This implies that Kosovo-Metohija is not the province of the Albanian minority but only an element in Serbia's territorial organization.

The Programme of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) expresses the same view on the relationship between territorial autonomy and ethnic minority rights. Ethnic minorities cannot have any territorial autonomy, regardless of their share in the total population in specific regions. Although it is not expressly stated, this obviously refers to the status of the Albanians and their policy regarding Kosovo-Metohija. This can also be applied to the demand of the Hungarians in Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina for three-way autonomy, which also includes territorial autonomy. The Programme of the DSS says nothing about Serbia's territorial organization, but the use of the term "region" in this context indicates the DSS's negative view on the existence of provinces in Serbia, as special territorial units.

The DSS's Programme contains a general view on the status of ethnic minorities in Serbia. According to the DSS, they should have all the ethnic minority rights recognized by international law. This view from the section on ethnic policy is further elaborated on in the section on education, science and culture, in which it is stated that members of ethnic minorities should be allowed to receive primary education in their own mother tongue in state schools.

The current Programme of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), adopted at the Second World Congress of this party in March 1993 employs erms different from the usual ones to describe the key problems dealt with in this paper. The term "Old Serbia" is used instead of "Kosovo- Metohija" or the abbreviation "Kosmet", "Raska" instead of "Sandzak", and "Shiptars" instead of "Albanians". The SPO's term for "Albanians" was used before the change in the constitutional status of Kosovo- Metohija in 1968, and its term for the region was used before the world wars. The Programme thus expresses a certain traditional symbolism, which is highly prominent in the political treatment of these problems. In this sense, the Programme stresses that Old Serbia is the seat of the religion, culture and historical memory of all Serbs.

The SPO's Programme, similarly to the ones mentioned above, contains general ideas about the status of ethnic minorities. It states that ethnic minorities in Serbia and the FRY should have the rights enjoyed by ethnic minorities in "the most democratic countries of the world". Specifically, the SPO demands that a historical injustice done to the Serbs be redressed; namely, it demands the annulment of all the laws and decrees passed by the postwar communist regime whereby Serbs were forcibly moved out of their homes or were not allowed to return to their homes from which they had been expelled by the Nazi occupiers during World War Two, which effectively altered the ethnic map of the region.

A special section of the SPO's Programme is dedicated to Old Serbia, i.e. to Kosovo-Metohija, stressing that the "Shiptar issue" is Serbia's internal issue which can be settled only by democratic means. The Programme states that only a democratic Serbia, attractive to all, can also be attractive to the Albanian minority, which can enjoy maximum ethnic, religious and civil rights, on the basis of international agreements on ethnic minorities, but only within a democratic Serbian state.

Dissatisfied with the policy pursued by government bodies in Kosovo- Metohija and its results, the SPO issued in March 1994 a programmatic leaflet with the basic question: "What will become of Kosovo- Metohija?" The leaflet stressed that the policy being pursued by the Serbian regime played into the hands of those eager "to create an independent Albanian state out of the Serbian Jerusalem". In contrast, the Albanian separatist movement is most threatened by those political forces in Serbia advocating Serbia's full democratization which would create conditions not only for general prosperity but also for the international recognition of the true goals of the Albanian separatists. The leaflet also emphasized the tendency of the Serbs to leave Kosovo-Metohija. The SPO proposed an alternative policy of "good life and democracy", which should make most Albanians accept Serbia as their own homeland. The SPO also promised to build 150,000 flats for the Serbs who had been forced to leave Kosovo-Metohija, to give them jobs and loans to set up their own businesses and to make investments in modern schools, hospitals and roads. Finally, the party said it was capable of putting these ideas into practice, for which it seeks popular support.

The Programme of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), adopted at its Third Homeland Congress in January 1994, is the only parliamentary party programme which does not contain views on the special rights of ethnic minorities. The Programme's Article 5 stresses only "full civil equality of all ethnic minorities" in a state of citizens, i.e. in a civilized legal system securing the legitimacy of the Government and the legality of its decisions. The precondition for the equal civil status of members of ethnic minorities is that they do not question Serbia's and Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Article 13 of this Programme is dedicated to Kosovo-Metohija. This is the largest article of the Programme, and it specifies measures for quelling the Albanian separatist rebellion "by all possible means". The following measures are proposed: a review of registry books and citizenship rights on the basis of the 1991 census (note: the Albanians largely boycotted the 1991 census); abolishing the autonomous provinces on Serbia's territory; expelling all Albanian immigrants and their descendants; returning the land seized from Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church to their rightful owners; preventing any financing by the state of the Albanian ethnic minority and rechanelling these funds to facilitate the return of Serbs to Kosovo- Metohija; collecting taxes and fees for communal services from Albanians; laying off the Albanians who are not citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia; taking away passports from those Albanians who are citizens of Serbia but who have engaged in separatist activity abroad; locating military, police and other Government installations in Kosovo-Metohija; providing state subsidies for the Serbs settling in Kosovo (housing loans, new jobs, funds for new businesses); and improving conditions for classes held in the Serbian language at Prishtina University.

This list of measures sums up the SRS's Programme for settling the issue of Kosovo-Metohija and the problem of the Albanian ethnic minority in Serbia and the FRY.

The Civil Alliance of Serbia (GSS) adopted two programmatic documents at its Constituent Assembly in February 1994. These are the Letter of Intent and the Programme. The former stresses the priorities in carrying out ethnic policy. The fourth priority mentioned is the relationship of this party to ethnic minorities. The GSS's general view is that the legal and actual status of ethnic minorities can be ensured only by a democratic Serbia, safeguarding the rights and freedoms of each citizen and, on this basis, guaranteeing the ethnic and other rights in order to preserve the identity of ethnic minorities. The GSS says that these rights can exceed those guaranteed by international law, provided the exercise of these rights does not threaten the territorial integrity of Serbia and the FRY.

This general view is elaborated on in the Programme of the GSS, which endorses tolerance, dialogue and good will in easing ethnic tensions and resolving conflicts in a multiethnic community such as Serbia. Two mechanisms which may lead to a peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts are stressed - autonomy and special rights for ethnic communities and ethnic minorities. Autonomy is seen as territorial (province), cultural (mother country) and religious (church). All forms of autonomy are acceptable for the sake of ethnic, cultural and religious pluralism in our complex society and expression of the feeling of authentic affiliation with a smaller community within society as a whole. As for the special rights of ethnic, religious and other communities, the GSS advocates their respect according to the highest international legal standards. Conflict situations in the exercise of these rights, such as those in Kosovo-Metohija, Sandzak and Vojvodina, must be resolved within the democratic institutions of society and government, through dialogue and without setting any preconditions.

The Programme does not elaborate on the view expressed in the Letter of Intent that ethnic minorities may be given greater rights than those mentioned in international documents. It can only be assumed that the party would accept any standards in the protection of ethnic minority rights higher than those customary in international law if only that could be agreed through dialogue.

Neither document says anything about Kosovo-Metohija or the Albanian ethnic minority as a separate problem.

The Serbian Resistance Movement was founded in Kosovo-Metohija in the summer of 1994. The Movement emerged as an expression of the dissatisfaction of the Serbs in the province with the methods and effects of the state's efforts to resolve their numerous problems. In August 1994, the leaders of the Movement published A Letter to the Serbian Public, summing up the reasons for forming the Movement and its goals. Essentially, they were dissatisfied by the fact that, although Serbia's bodies of government had the legal possibility of taking action, the Albanian secessionist movement was steadily achieving its key goals - the activity of the shadow Albanian state and the continuing exodus of Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija. The Movement's leaders wrote in this document that the Serbian regime has turned the Serbian question in Kosovo-Metohija into an ideological and party issue and that it has created rifts among Serbs, using them as its own political instrument. The Movement's leaders stressed that in March 1995 it had been five years since the adoption of the Programme for Kosovo and that the Programme had simply failed. In accordance with this view and the views stated in A Letter, the Movement's leaders have made the following nine demands: 1) Serbia should state clearly what it wants to do about Kosovo-Metohija and how it intends to settle the Serbian issue in this part of Serbia; 2) measures should urgently be taken to stop the Albanization and eventual loss of Kosovo-Metohija; 3) no one has the right to abandon Kosovo-Metohija; 4) the Albanian shadow state - the so-called Republic of Kosovo - must be disrupted; 5) the Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija should not be bypassed in efforts to resolve the problem; 6) specific measures should be taken to protect Serbs from Albanian separatism and from being pushed out by Albanians; 7) a programme for settling Serbs in Kosovo should urgently be drawn up and funds raised for its implementation; 8) Serbia should pass a law on citizenship immediately and resolve the question of Albanian immigrants; 9) the parliaments of the FRY, Serbia and Montenegro should immediately open debates about Kosovo-Metohija and the effects to date of Serbia's official policy towards Kosovo- Metohija.

The Movement was basically formed for the purpose of mediating in efforts to reach a Serbian national consensus on Kosovo-Metohija. Representatives of government bodies, all parliamentary parties, Serbian cultural and spiritual institutions (The Orthodox Church, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, representatives of scientific institutions and universities) were expected to take part in this dialogue. They were to form a Serbian National Council which was to formulate a new policy towards Kosovo-Metohija. The result was quite the opposite: the authorities came into conflict with the opposition. The regime did not allow anyone to interfere with its policies, so that the Movement focused on the opposition. At a conference in Gracanica (Kosovo-Metohija) organized by the Movement in May 1995, a Declaration was adopted on the Serb national policy today, which concerned the overall question of statehood and, within that framework, the question of Kosovo-Metohija. Article One of the Declaration expressed the fundamental view of the conference that a definite abolishment of territorial autonomy in Serbia is an essential precondition for a permanent resolution of the Kosovo problem. The Serbian National Council was formed at the conference and entrusted with drawing up a national programme.

In this presentation, we should also mention the activity of a number of nongovernmental and nonpartisan organizations which have in the past five or six years dealt with the issue of Serbian-Albanian relations and the question of Kosovo-Metohija in particular. Their common denominator is the attempt to start a dialogue between the Serbian and Albanian parties to the dispute. It needs to be stressed that the political impact of these initiatives has been negligible, because, as a rule, they have been launched by intellectuals with little political influence. These talks have given rise to certain ideas for conflict resolution, presented at a number of meetings, in collections of papers or as part of projects, which so far have failed to have any impact on the main parties to the conflict.

Before the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia, a number of round tables on these problems were held in Mostar, Prishtina and Belgrade. They were organized by the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI). The results of these round tables have been presented in Republika magazine ("Untangling the Kosovo Knot", September 1993). The European Movement in Serbia, the European Movement of Kosovo and the Helsinki Parliament of Citizens have also launched a number of initiatives.

The Soros Foundation in Yugoslavia has started a project entitled "The Serbian-Albanian Dialogue". Several individual solutions for resolving the problem of Kosovo and the problem of interethnic relations in Serbia and the FRY have been proposed as part of this project. During the federal government of Milan Panic (June 1992-April 1993), a project entitled "Democracy and the Protection of Minorities" emerged from these circles. It was offered to the Government as the basis for drawing up a law on ethnic minorities ("Theses for Drawing Up a Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Minority Communities and Their Members"). The project was rejected after the Panic Government was replaced.

All these initiatives and documents which came in their wake are proof of the good will of various associations of citizens to work out this major problem. Their lack of real political influence shows that dialogue and tolerance as a way of approaching the problem by the main protagonists of the conflict (Serbs and Albanians and their political representatives) depend on some deeper political assumptions.

3. A special approach

The problem of Kosovo-Metohija is extremely complex and antinomic. Kosovo-Metohija was the centre of mediaeval Serbian statehood and culture. This is an area which for centuries was under Turkish occupation and Turkish administration. After its liberation from the Turks, it became part of the sovereign Serbian state in 1912, but with a largely altered ethnic composition. During World War Two it was occupied by Fascist Italy, although formally it was ruled by Albania, as Italy's war ally. After World War Two, it became part of the communist Yugoslav state, getting for the first time the status of a territorial autonomy, gradually assuming the characteristics of a separate unit within the federal state. From 1961 on, Serbs began moving out of Kosovo at a much higher rate, and the growth of the Albanian population further intensified. Throughout the recent history (from the second half of the 19th century) this has been the area of an unresolved Serbian-Albanian territorial dispute, without appropriate democratic institutions and solutions. The problem has culminated in the last decade, during which the measures taken by the Serbian state collided head on with an organized Albanian movement, with mutually exclusive goals. The extremely antagonistic and antinomic nature of the problem is keeping it in a state of irresolution, at the same time eliciting different kinds of solutions aimed at achieving a lasting peace in the region.

One of the proposals for a peaceful solution to the problem, but different from any solution proposed in the past, was recently presented to the public in Serbia. It deserves our attention not because of its political influence by primarily because of the meticulous and well-argued explanation of the basic idea for the resolution of the problem. This project was offered in a book by Branislav Krstic entitled Kosovo Between Historical and Ethnic Rights (1994). We will present here the main elements of this project, which are gaining more and more supporters in certain influential Serbian intellectual circles.

The author's main idea is that the conflict must be resolved in accordance with its nature. Since the dispute is essentially territorial, it calls for an appropriate political and territorial solution. Methodologically neglecting the current state and legal status of Kosovo-Metohija, the author claims that this is a conflict between two types of rights - the Serbian historical right and the Albanian ethnic right. Both rights have firm territorial equivalents - laying a claim to political rule over territory. The conflict between these two rights can be peacefully resolved only by dividing up Kosovo-Metohija's territory. In this way, both rights would be realized, and a peaceful solution, as the general goal, would be achieved.

Today's make-up of Kosovo-Metohija's population (81.6% of Albanians and 9.9% of Serbs), coupled with the general political situation, gives the author reason to observe the interests of the Albanian ethnic community with more political benevolence compared to the usual view that the Albanians' rights derive from their minority status. Namely, the problem cannot be resolved even if the highest standards in the protection of ethnic minority rights are applied. In addition, it is not realistic to expect the reintegration of Albanians as loyal and contented citizens of Serbia. Nor can the permanent terrorizing of the majority of the population in the province by the state lead to a definite solution. The ethnic right of the Albanians appears entirely as a problem sui generis.

On the other hand, Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija were forced to leave the province (as the cradle of Serbian statehood) under political pressure from the majority Albanian population and settle in other parts of the country. What is more, their own state looked favourably on this exodus. The author cites historical, demographic and statistical figures corroborating this claim. With Kosovo-Metohija having the constitutional status of an autonomous province in communist Yugoslavia and its competence being expanded to the level of a federal unit, the question of the Albanian minority was being resolved over a period of several decades as a political and territorial question. The demographic effects of this policy were as follows: from 1961 to 1981 alone, 42.2% of Serbs and 63.3% of Montenegrins left Kosovo-Metohija, while the size of the Albanian population increased 2.5 times. Such a trend had not been recorded in any previous period. From 1931 to 1961, regardless of the massive exodus of Serbs during the Fascist occupation of Kosovo, the Serbian population increased 1.8 times, and the Albanian population 1.9 times. The expansion of the Albanian population in the said period coincided with the taking over of towns and villages and land by Albanians,which the author illustrates with population trends in all of Kosovo's towns and villages from 1931 to 1991. These figures clearly indicate that since 1961 Serbian ethnic communities have been disappearing rapidly, with a drastic reduction in the number of ethnically mixed communities (this is the most pronounced trend - 78 ethnically mixed communities have become purely Albanian) and an increase in the number of purely Albanian communities (by 250). At the same time, the real estate market assumed clearly ethnic characteristics, with Albanians as the sole buyers and Serbs as the only sellers of houses and land. All three processes - the growth of the Albanian population, the decrease in the number of Serbs, and the taking over of towns and villages and land by Albanians coincided with the constitutional changes whereby the Republic of Serbia delegated constitutional, legislative, executive and legal powers to the province.

This brief demographic and historical overview, which is very exhaustive and illustrative in the book, is necessary for a better understanding of the criteria used by the author in his basic proposal for the division of territory. The ethnic criterion in the current composition and distribution of the population, which completely plays into the hands of the Albanian side, cannot be the only one because it would legitimate the wrong done to Serbs over a period of thirty years. Criteria ensuring respect for the historical right of the Serbs must be introduced. The author cites as the most important criteria the territorial distribution of historical monuments and land ownership, partly adjusted in accordance with the situation prevailing in 1961.

According to the author of this study, if the territorial distribution of Serbian historical monuments is used as a criterion, it will be comparatively easy to define a relatively compact Serbian area. We will not restrict ourselves here to monuments of the 1st and 2nd categories according to UNESCO's classification, since 3rd-category monuments are distributed more or less throughout the province. It is thus possible to define an area with 36 Serbian historical monuments (monasteries, churches, anchorites' cells, remains of mediaeval Serbian cities, buildings, memorials) dating back to the period from the 12th to the 16th century. Only one 1st-category monument and six 2nd-category monuments would remain outside this area. It is a propitious circumstance that the areas of Albanian cultural monuments (most of them dating from the 19th century) are different from the area of concentrated Serbian cultural monuments of the 1st and 2nd categories. Another propitious circumstance is that the Albanian population in this area is less concentrated than elsewhere.

The other criterion for dividing up Kosovo-Metohija's province, which could correct the current state of the Albanian demographic dominance (and the ethnic criterion of division which follows from it) is land ownership. Despite massive land-buying campaigns over the past three decades and the virtual ethnification of the real estate market, the Serbs own at least double the share of land owned by the Albanians, in proportion to their respective shares in the total population. In other words, land ownership must also be taken as a criterion for the division of territory, and not just the ethnic composition of the population.

Before getting down to the concrete application of the three criteria for the division of territory - the ethnic distribution of the population, the territorial distribution of historical monuments and the nationality of the land owners - the author sets forth five principles he is guided by in presenting his proposal for a peaceful resolution of this enduring and serious conflict. These principles are: (1) both rights - the Serbian historical right and the Albanian ethnic right - are legitimate; (2) neither of these rights is valid unless it has been legally realized; (3) neither side can exercise its right if that means depriving the other side of its own right; (4) the historical and ethnic rights were created in specific areas, so that there is a territorial dimension to the realization of these rights; (5) neither side can demand recognition for its rights unless it is willing to recognize the relevant rights of the other side.

In light of these criteria and principles, the author proposes their practical application, i.e. the territorial division of Kosovo- Metohija.

The proposed division includes four cumulative steps. In steps A and B the western and southern areas with predominant Albanian populations are formed. These two areas cover almost half of the total Albanian population according to the 1981 census and only 15.3% of the total Serbian population. Only one 1st-category and six 2nd-category Serb historical monuments are located on this territory. However, 630,000 Albanians according to the 1981 census, or 329,000 according to the 1961 census, remain outside this territory. This unfortunate circumstance is corrected by two possible options for redefining territories. According to one of the options (step C), the towns of Pec and Prizren are divided up, which is necessary as these are towns with dominant Albanian populations but also with important Serbian cultural monuments. This option will give territorial autonomy to 53.2% Albanians (according to the 1981 census). In historically Serbian territories the ratio of the Serbian and Albanian populations would be 22.6% to 66% according to the 1981 census, or 38.7% to 53% according to the 1961 census. This ratio, unfavourable for either side, can be partly corrected by using the other option (step D) - incorporating another compact Albanian area (in the northeast of the province) into the Albanian territorial autonomy. After taking this step, there would be 24.6% of Serbs against 62.8% of Albanians in historically Serbian territories, according to the 1981 census, or 41.2% of Serbs against 49.7% of Albanians, according to the 1961 census. The Albanian autonomous area would cover 59.9% of the total Albanian population in Kosovo-Metohija.

All these steps and options are accompanied by appropriate maps and demographic statistical figures.

The author's final proposal is that the Serbian historical territory defined in this way be separated from the province as it is now and be declared an area of special cultural and historical significance for the Serbian people, while the area with a predominantly Albanian population be declared an area of Albanian territorial autonomy with special status. In this area, the Albanians could in time fully exercise their right to self-determination, holding a referendum or declaring their politica l will in some other democratic way.

We have paid proportionally more attention to this proposal for the resolution of the question of Kosovo-Metohija and the Serbian-Albanian dispute because we regard it as important, well-founded and well- argued. The territorial aspect of the entire problem is now a political taboo, as both sides hope to gain political domination of Kosovo-Metohija's entire territory. This view is shared by all parties within both political spectra (democratic and authoritarian), and it constitutes a framework for achieving a specific political balance within each spectrum. In these circumstances, it may be quite natural for an individual to come up with a proposal of this kind. However, the specific political weight of such a solution is increased by the fact that it has met with the tacit approval, at least on the Serbian side, of certain intellectuals and politicians.

4. Alternative solutions to the problem of Kosovo-Metohija - conditions and consequences

In this section we will present possible ways of resolving the problem of Kosovo-Metohija and the Serbian-Albanian dispute. We will try to present briefly the type of solution, the conditions and possibilities of its application and the consequences of its application. We will bear in mind the realistic range of approaches to the problem, which includes not only Serbian political protagonists, but also Albanian ones (in Kosovo-Metohija), as well as international mediators.

(a) Official solution advocated by the authorities and government bodies in Serbia and the FRY

Kosovo-Metohija, as one of Serbia's autonomous provinces. The competence of the province in the spirit of territorial autonomy; governed by the Serbian Constitution and the statute of the province; the province has a parliament, elected in general elections, and executive and administrative bodies. The competence of provincial authorities in the areas of education, health care, social welfare and culture in line with the general policy being carried out by Serbia and the FRY. Local executive and administrative autonomy.

The rights of the Albanian community as minority rights -special linguistic, educational and cultural rights - in accordance with the Constitution, laws and international legal standards in the protection of minorities.

Conditions for the solution: integration of the Albanian community into the political and legal system of Serbia and the FRY; the Albanian community entirely rejects this condition.

Consequences: development of parallel political, economic, cultural and educational Albanian structures in Kosovo-Metohija; suspension by the state of legal regulatory possibilities in virtually all areas of life; emergency measures; the state's long-term reliance on repressive measures; the exodus of Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija continues.

(b) Programmatic solutions advocated by democratically oriented political parties and associations in Serbia

Democratic consensus on ethnic and statehood issues, with the participation of legitimate representatives of the minorities, including the Albanians. Dialogue with Albanian representatives about the resolution of their ethnic issue, both in its entirety and in separate sections (e.g. education). The only condition for dialogue - the Albanians should not question the territorial integrity of Serbia and the FRY.

Seeking a long-term solution in a genuine democratization of Serbia and the federal state, stable guarantees of individual and collective rights and the rule of law.

Orientation to state regionalization and decentralization of power, with special solutions for the territorially compact ethnic minorities. In this context, distancing away from the constitutional solutions allowing for autonomous provinces.

Condition for the solution: increasing the influence of the democratic opposition and winning the support of the Albanians for this long-term solution; linking the Albanians' political prospects to the development of democracy in Serbia.

Consequences and possible outcomes: reaching an elementary consensus and embarking on legal and institutional solutions based on democratic dialogue.

Chances of succeeding: the Albanian side is not ready to opt for this strategy. The political weakness and organizational fragmentation of Serbia's democratic opposition makes this strategy additionally unrealistic; there is a great deal of mistrust between Serbian democratic parties and Albanian political organizations.

(c) Radical political solutions on the Serbian side

Cancellation of provincial autonomy in the Serbian Constitution; organizing Serbia as a centralized, unitary state. Reviewing the citizenship status of all Albanians and expelling from the country all those failing to meet the legal requirements for citizenship and those politically disloyal to the state. Settling Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija and giving them special privileges in order to make life in this part of the republic easier.

Conditions: bringing an even larger state repressive machinery to Kosovo; investing huge funds in maintaining this machinery and implementing plans for the return of Serbs to Kosovo. Radicalization of the general political mood in Serbia and the FRY regarding Kosovo and the Albanian issue.

Consequences: an increase in the intensity of the conflict, with the permanent danger of an armed Albanian uprising; Serbia's increasing isolation from the world; a further destabilization of the region (the role of Albania, Macedonia's Albanians and their political allies); military interference of the international community in the conflict (NATO and the U.S.).

(d) Albanian solution for an independent and autonomous Kosovo

The illegal shadow government and parallel economic, educational and social welfare systems will grow stronger, becoming increasingly self- perpetuating and capable of functioning independently until global circumstances become favourable and Serbia and the FRY become weak internally to a degree allowing Kosovo to secede with comparatively little pain. During this period, exhibit resolutely disloyalty to the state and practise civil disobedience, and do not enter any talks or activities which might suggest acceptance of the legal state structure. During a possible dialogue with the state, act as a partner equal to the state and insist on solutions leading towards legitimate secession. Emphasize internationalization of the problem.

Conditions: political compactness of all Albanian protagonists; weakening of the Serbian state and further polarization and fragmentation of Serbian political protagonists; economic exhaustion of Serbia - positive effects of international sanctions; the international community's benevolent view on the strategy for Kosovo's secession.

Consequences: radicalization of the regime's policy and political parties's policies towards Kosovo-Metohija; radicalization of Serbian public opinion; an increase in government repression of the Albanians and an intensification of the conflict; end of all hopes of a dialogue on a gradual resolution of the problem.

(e) International proposal for special status

The proposal by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague (1991). Special status for areas in which members of ethnic groups (minorities) are in a majority. Special application of this solution to Kosovo-Metohija. The right to use ethnic symbols and the right to an autonomous educational system, legislature and administration, including a regional police force and courts. Demilitarization of the region and international control.

Conditions: acceptance of the proposal by both parties to the conflict; both parties trusting the impartiality of the international mediator. Neither of these conditions is realistic; the other condition cannot be fulfilled, especially from the Serbian point of view - bad experience with international mediation in the case of the Yugoslav state crisis and the international community's attitude to the rights of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Consequences: Albanians push Serbs out in all areas of life; Serbs continue to leave Kosovo.

(f) Division of Kosovo-Metohija's territory

Divide Kosovo-Metohija into a Serb part and an Albanian part on the basis of clear and generally acceptable criteria and principles. After the division, the Albanian part should have the right to make an autonomous political choice. Allow two options to the population remaining in a minority after the division: either relocation of these people to territories where their fellow-Serbs/Albanians are in a majority, with prior provision of basic living conditions, or allowing them to stay, with guarantees of all human and ethnic minority rights.

Conditions: Agreement of the Serbian and Albanian sides on this solution; help from the international community in providing resources for humanitarian relocation; international control of the state of ethnic minority rights following the division of territory.

Difficulties and consequences: potential conflicts regarding the criteria and principles of division; difficulties concerning specific divisions and the creation of geographically and economically compact regions; problems concerning the acceptance of specific solutions by the numerically dominant Albanian population and the cancellation of their acquired rights; dissatisfaction of the Serbs over ceding part of Serbian territory.

General advantage: prospects for a permanent resolution of the conflict.

Belgrade, June 1995

*The programme is good proof of the political illusion at the time that serious historical problems can be resolved by means of administrative measures. The Programme's 95 items specified, among other things, the following measures: accelerating the adoption of laws consistently applied in the entire Serbia; making a list of all citizens willing to go to Kosovo and organizing by mid-June 1990 the departure of the first group of settlers for Kosovo; determining the exact number of persons from Albania who are not SFRY citizens; determining the origin of the vast sums of money Albanians used for buying land and houses from Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo; forming new municipalities in areas with compact Serb populations; as of the academic year 1990-1991, enroling extra numbers of Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and members of other ethnic groups in Prishtina University; starting the construction of 750 flats for Serb returnees without delay in all large towns in the province; taking measures to reduce the birth rate and adjust demographic growth in Kosovo to the province's economic potential; pass laws on family planning etc. This ambitious administrative programme ended up in a total fiasco in the five years that followed.

END