THE TRUTH ABOUT GORAZDE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

VAUGHN S. FORREST AND YOSSEF BODANSKY

Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare
HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
MAY 04, 1994.

CHIEF OF STAFF'S NOTE: All wars by their nature "kill the truth," and the current war in the Balkans must rank with the others of this century in the damage that has been done to the facts. The Task Force reports on the Balkans have been among the most contentions for our membership because we have been perceived to have taken sides. Indeed, the combatants on all sides of the Balkan conflict have accused the Task Force of supporting their opponents.

I take this as a compliment to the professionalism and objectivity of our staff. Our task has been to discover the truth wherever it leads in order to give our membership a basis for informed and independent decision making in the face of disinformation especially when American lives may be on the line. Given that fact, this report will be seen as no less contentions by those who have themselves chosen sides.

- Vaughn S. Forrest

In recent weeks, the small industrial town of Gorazde in Bosnia- Hercegovina has come to symbolize in the eyes of the Western media the brutality of the latest Balkan war. The siege of Gorazde has been portrayed as a ruthless act of aggression against Bosnia's Muslim population and has become the focal point of Western efforts to put an end to the bloodshed. However, while Bosnian Serb aggressiveness has undoubtedly played a large part in the Gorazde tragedy, what is less known is the role played by the Bosnian government and military in instigating the conflict and in efforts to draw the West, particularly the United States, into the war generally.

The origins of the Gorazde situation may be traced back to the traumatic events that took place in the region in the Fall of 1992. Gorazde's strategic location on the Drina river, combined with the fact that the town was home to the Pobjeda (Victory) Munitions factory, made it almost immediately a target for the contending forces. With the state of Montenegro close by, and the city itself providing access to several major highways, both Muslim and Serb forces were well aware of the stakes involved in capturing Gorazde.

At the outset, the advantage went to the Bosnians who, backed by "Afghan" - mainly Arab - volunteers, were able to drive out the Christian population in what was described as an act of ethnic- cleansing." Operating in detachments of 15 to 20 highly trained and well equipped men, the Bosnian forces and their allies launched hit and run tactics that were to become the dominant feature of the early stages of the war and that often found hapless civilians trapped in the crossfire. Further, by exploiting UN relief efforts into the town, the Bosnian Muslims were able to infiltrate Gorazde, taking advantage of the fact that the Serbs were compelled to withdraw in order to make way for humanitarian operations Thus, by 1993, Gorazde was being reestablished as a military center by the Bosnian Muslims.

In due course, however, backed by Serbia and Montenegro, the Bosnian Serbs were able to launch a counteroffensive and lay siege to Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as other Muslim enclaves It was at this juncture, when the Bosnian Muslims were quite convinced that their military situation was beyond recovery without outside assistance, that the Bosnian Government switched tactics and began to use political means to draw in Western support.

Taking advantage of the UN relief effort once again, the Bosnian Muslims began to make active military preparations in Gorazde for an attack against the Serbs There is evidence that the United Nations Organization acquiesced in these preparations, as it was discovered by the Serbs that, in one relief convoy, electronic equipment, hard currency and Bosnian Government documents were being smuggled into the town.

Later, in March, 1994, the Bosnian forces began launching shelling attacks out of the Gorazde pocket againSt Serb positions between Foca and Canjice, subsequently launching a ground offensive aimed at a highway leading to the Montenegrin border. The Serb response was slow but determined. It took the Serbs a week to bring in reinforcements, launch a cunteroffensive and renew the siege, thereby shattering an earlier negotiated cease fire.

With Gorazde now fully under attack, the Bosnian Government began an extensive propaganda campaign aimed at the West and at highlighting the plight of the town's civilian population. During this campaign, the United States' Ambassador to the United Nations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs arrived in Sarajevo to declare their sympathy for the Muslim population. This unprecedented act convinced Bosnian President Izetbegovic that the United States would support the Muslim cause and indeed might even directly intervene on its behalf.

From this point on, the essence of Bosnian strategy became one of drawing down Serb military actions against Gorazde in order to elicit western sympathy. Ironically, Bosnia's propaganda machine would often portray to the West an image of a city on the brink of collapse while showing the Muslim world an image of a town resolutely defending itself against long odds. However, throughout the Bosnian message the theme of Western intervention was consistent and this ultimately had its effect.

Despite periodic cease fires, Gorazde was repeatedly attacked No sooner would a truce take hold than it would break down, either because of Serb efforts to consolidate their positions, as was the case with an April 10th cease fire, or because of Muslim provocations, as was the case with an April 11th agreement. In both cases, the cease fires were brought about by Unites States military action, and in both cases the violations were undertaken to draw the West deeper into the conflict.

More significant, however, is the evidence which suggests that the United Nations air strikes, although ostensibly launched to protect UN personnel in Gorazde, were either coordinated with, or revealed in advance to, the Muslim forces - particularly in the case of the April 11 action. Indeed, Bosnian Muslim forces were reported to have been making preparations to exploit the UN bombing raids well before they took place.

The Bosnian Serbs, observing Bosnian preparations, declared Gorazde to be no longer a safe zone and subsequently began a general siege of the town. This increased the pressure on the United Nations to take further military action or have its prestige called into question, and put the initiative into the hands of the Bosnian Muslims.

Subsequently, NAT0 produced a series of ultimatums requiring that either the Serbs withdraw or be subjected to massive military action. This was augmented by a series NAT0 reconnaissance and simulates strikes in which a Sea Harrier off the British carrier HMS Ark Royal was shot down. The Serbs inability to implement an April l9 cease fire led to a firm NAT0 ultimatum that finally convinced the Serbs that further action would be dangerous.

Thus, by April 24, with a UN relief convoy approaching Gorazde, the contending forces at last began to disengage and UN force- began moving into position. As the Serbs withdrew, they destroyed part of the Pobjeda munitions factory, including the water pumping facility that had served as a makeshift water supply for Gorazde's residents. This fact was exploited by Muslim propaganda as a ruthless act of revenge.

When UN teams entered Gorazde, they failed to find any evidence of Serb forces or weapons inside the town, although they did confirm that the Bosnian Muslims had used the city hospital as a military post. Nonetheless, it was discovered that Gorazde was damaged far less and casualties were far lighter than Bosnian Muslim propaganda had reported - about 200 wounded as against the reported toll of 1970.

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