Undermining Peace
Serbs wouldn't negotiate until NATO bombardment forced them to.
The Serb side accepted the principles of a revised Contact Group Plan
(the basis for the Dayton agreement) well before NATO intervention had
started. More importantly, essentially the same peace plan (mostly
EU-sponsored) has been on the negotiating table on several previous
occasions - even before war had begun - but was undermined by our
government, and consequently the Bosnian Muslim leaders, each time.
From the beginning, the Muslim side has been holding out for the big
(if unrealistic) prize - a unitary Bosnia - and hoping to provoke
Western intervention to that end. The U.S. stance toward the conflict
has consistently encouraged such behavior and needlessly prolonged the
war, with all its consequences.
November, 1995, Dayton, USA
Signing of the peace agreement and
territorial division of Bosnia & Herzegovina
"From the U.S. campaign
for Bosnian independence in March 1992 to the Washington-
sponsored Croat-Muslim federation in March 1994, American
diplomacy has fanned the flames of war."
"POLICY WITHOUT PRINCIPLE"
The Nation, January 30 1996,
by Joan Hoey
"For four years, the U.S. and its Western allies say they want peace
in Bosnia. The U.S. manages to bring about an important agreement
among the warring parties, an essential first step.
Then, to show its good faith, the U.S. deep in the war and directing
the military strategy of NATO, chooses to hit harder than ever at
one of those three parties.
How can this be happening - getting all sides to agree and then
deliberately trying to smash one of them with bombs and missiles?
Are we plain mad? Not really, but in part it is a kind of sickness,
the kind that can come with overriding military power. If a superpower
does not have to worry about foreign reaction, if its own people
pay no attention and if its leader is so insecure that he thinks
one way to stay, in office is to bomb a people that have never
offended or threatened his own, why, he can just go ahead and bomb,
if that is to his taste.
This is also known as the absolute corruption of absolute power.
Normally that happens in dictatorships. But if a people living in
freedom do not care upon whom their bombs fall, it can happen in
their own, democracy.
Bosnian Serbs believe there is a method in the madness. They have
agreed, as they should , to an American plan that gives them some
hope of freedom from the imposition of Bosnian Muslim rule - their
reason for fighting in the first place. But there is an enormous
amount still to be agreed on before peace is a reality.
And they fear that the purpose of the bombing is to soften them up
so much that the Bosnian Muslims, again helped by Croatia, would
launch an offensive that would destroy them before they attained
the freedom to choose their political destiny.
In other words, a double-cross. I hate to think that and until I
see evidence I will try not to."
FOR AMERICAN WORTH - STOP BOMBING BOSNIAN SERBS
The New York Times, September, 12, 1995.,
by A.M.Rosenthal
"I believe that the U.S. approach to the war in Bosnia is torn by a fundamental
contradiction. The United States says that its objective is to end the war
through a negotiated settlement, but in reality what it wants is to influence
the outcome in favor of the Muslims.The United States, for example, watched
approvingly as Muslim offensives began this spring, even though these attacks
destroyed a ceasefire Washington has supported."
"Finally,
rather than work toward a cease-fire to fend off the looming tragedy, Bosnian
government actions were clearly orchestrated to create the conditions for NATO
air strikes, not a cessation of hostilities."
"MAKING PEACE WITH THE GUILTY: THE TRUTH
ABOUT BOSNIA"
Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 1995,
by General Charles G. Boyd,
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command.
"It is undoubtedly the case that the United States
and the European Community encouraged the Izetbegovic
government to hold the referendum on secession in the first
place. It also appears to be true that the United States
encouraged Izetbegovic to reject the EC-sponsored
cantonuzation plan agreed upon in two separate meetings in
late winter 1992. Izetbegovic's repudiation of the second
agreement on returning to Sarajevo was the immediate trigger
for the war. "
"AMERICA AND BOSNIA"
National Interest 33, Fall 1993,
by contributing editor Robert W. Tucker, and David C. Hendrickson,
associate professor of political science at Colorado College.
"Few have noted that in 1992, Baker literally created the supposedly
independent and supposedly sovereign Bosnia and Hercegovina with its
Muslim president, Alija Izetbegovic, thereby provoking Europe's
first protracted war since 1945. He did so with the blessing of
President Bush and with considerable input from Larry Eagleburger
and Warren Zimmermann - past and contemporary ambassadors to
Belgrade. Their design was both complex and devious, but they were
so convinced of its efficacy that they supported Izetbegovic in his
rejection of the European Community's Lisbon plan for dividing
Bosnia and Hercegovina in a federative scheme."
"Having fatally wounded the Vance-Owen plan, the
Clintonites went on to undermine its successor, the Stoltenberg-
Owen plan, which also flopped as a result. The only constant in
the on-going, off-again Clinton approach to the war was continuing
support for the Bosnian Muslims. At no time did the United States
under Bush or under Clinton contemplate taking an even-handed
approach in the three-sided civil war.
As the war wore on, however, the United States gradually succumbed
to the long-term strategy of the Bosnian Muslims (which had been
in place at least since June 1991) to draft in US/NATO forces on their side."
"[...] by means of its misguided actions and non-
actions, the United States has greatly contributed since 1991 to
the prolongation of the Yugoslav wars, especially the Bosnian
conflict, and thereby to the needless deaths of tens of thousands
of Muslims, Croats and Serbs, the destruction of scores of cities
and hundreds of villages and the uprooting of several million
innocent civilians."
"THOUGHTS ON UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA"
The South Slav Journal, v. 16, No.
Autumn-Winter 1995,
by David Binder, former NYT Editor
and Balkan specialist
"Dayton is the fourth Bosnia peace plan produced since 1992 and the
culmination of a glacial process of U.S. acclimation to partition. The first
was a prewar scheme agreed to in European Community-sponsored talks at Lisbon
(February-March 1992).[...]
Tragically, the Lisbon plan failed when Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic
changed his mind and scuttled it. Although Warren Zimmermann, the American
representative at the talks, now denies it, most reliable reports suggest
that Izetbegovic acted with U.S. approval.
Next came the Vance-Owen plan (September 1992-May 1993). It proposed a
unitary federal Bosnia divided along ethnic lines into ten semiautonomous
cantons that would remain subordinate to a capable central government. The
Bosnian Serbs predictably rejected it since it denied them their prime goal,
national independence.
Vance-Owen was followed by a European proposal for veiled tripartite
partition (July 1993-January 1994). Resembling the Lisbon plan, it envisioned
three ethnic republics coexisting in a loose confederation under a powerless
central government that could not prevent the inevitable final breakup. Still
dreaming of a united Bosnia under their leadership, and again encouraged by
the U.S., the Muslims rejected it in early 1994.
At this point the U.S. had torpedoed two peace plans while endorsing none."
"WHEN PEACE MEANS WAR"
The New Republic, Dec. 18, 1995,
by John J. Mearsheimer,
professor of political science at the University of
Chicago and Stephen Van Evera,
associate professor of political science at M.I.T.
"[...] After several rounds of talks our 'principles for future
constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Hercegovina' were agreed
by all three parties (Muslim, Serb and Croat) in Sarajevo on March
18th as the basis for future negotiations. These continued, maps and
all, until the summer, when the Muslims reneged on the agreement.
Had they not done so, the Bosnian question might have been settled
earlier, with less loss of (mainly Muslim) life and land. To be fair,
President Izetbegovic and his aides were encouraged to scupper that
deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders
who thought they knew better."
The Economist, 9-15 Dec.1995 (in response to an earlier editorial),
by Jose Cutileiro,
Secretary-General, Western European Union,
and former chief EU negotiator at the Bosnian settlement talks in early 1992.
"The airport, for instance, where many UN soldiers have died, has been closed
more often due to direct government fire than Bosnian Serb fire. The periodic
ceasefires, likewise, do not conform to the perceived pattern. All, during my time
in the city [of Sarajevo], were broken by the government forces."
"Once, in the street outside our barracks, I met one
of the government soldiers and asked him rather pointedly why his side was
breaking the ceasefires. They had orders, he said. Sarajevo was too quiet:
to stay at the centre of the world's attention it needed to be its "normal"
self - it needed to be shelled. "
"Many thousands of people would have suffered immeasurably if it
was not for the co-operation shown to the UN by the Bosnian Serb authorities."
Account by Rod Thornton, British Army soldier,
served a year in central Bosnia as part of UN forces,
subsequently awarded the Queen's Gallantry Medal for conduct there,
currently scholar at Birmingham University
"Each time a peace agreement could be reached, an "incident" to stop it and
slander the Bosnian Serbs was bound to happen."
"JOINT US-MUSLIM WAR AGAINST THE SERBS - U.N. AS A U.S. PUPPET"
Strategic Policy, London, July-Aug. 1995, No. 7-8,
by Gregory Copley
"David Owen insists that Washington bears considerable responsibility for
undermining the Vance-Owen plan and thereby allowing the killing to
continue. He is merciless in his criticism of Warren Christopher,
Al Gore and the American ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine
Albright. [...] "
"The massive use of NATO air power last summer did not hasten a
solution in Bosnia because it cowed the Bosnian Serbs. As Lord
Owen explains, Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs, could exploit the tactic as skillfully as he
did only because he had persuaded Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian
President, that it was no longer in Serbia's interests to back the
Bosnian Serbs militarily. After the major NATO powers and Russia
proposed splitting the country in half (51 percent for the Croats
and Muslims and 49 percent for the Serbs) in the peace plan of
July 1994, he also made it plain to the Bosnian leadership that
there was no more territory available. This territorial dismemberment,
together with the American-brokered creation of a Bosnian-Croat-Muslim
federation in March 1994, effectively put an end to a unified
Bosnia. Without those other elements, the Balkans would have gone
up in a puff of smoke after the NATO action."
"THE 51 PERCENT SOLUTION"
The New York Times Sunday, January 21,1996
by Misha Glenny veteran BBC Eastern Europe and Balkan correspondent
currently a fellow at the Wilson Center
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