UN Failures and Safe Areas
Morally and formally, one of UN's key faliures was to protect Muslim "safe areas".
With respect
to these areas, UN's key failure was to define a clear and fair
humanitarian objective. Apart from harboring legitimate Muslim
civilians, all "safe areas" served as home for significant active
Muslim army resources, and as a springboard for their military
offensives. As such, using UNPROFOR military potential to "protect"
them was clearly not moral, and meant taking sides - in open
contradiction with the overall humanitarian objective of their
mission. Their real, much overlooked, failure was the total inability
to carry out their mandate in the UN Protected Areas in
Croatia/Krajina, and protect them from open Croatian aggression.
"Col.Segers claims that this [arms] embargo was never enforced strictly.
On the contrary, while he was in [the safe area of] Bihac as head of the
monitoring team, helicopters brimming with armaments for Dudakovic's
Muslim Fifth Corps and often with Red Cross signs on them, landed nightly
there."
Excerpts from review of account given by Colonel Jan Segers of Belgium,
former head of the UN Military Information Bureau in Zagreb
and member of the UN monitoring team in Sarajevo, Bihac and Western Slavonia.
UN in Bosnia.
Mission was destined to fail from the very beginning.
"During the counterattack, however, the
Bosnian government and many in the international community demanded that the
United Nations and NATO protect the Bihac safe area from Serb aggression. A
common theme was the impending humanitarian catastrophe if strong steps were
not taken, even though this was a fight that the Muslim army had picked, there
was limited damage to the safe area, and Bihac was the headquarters and
garrison town of the Bosnian units that had mounted the attack."
"MAKING PEACE WITH THE GUILTY: THE TRUTH
ABOUT BOSNIA"
Foreign Affairs, Sept. / Oct. 1995, by General Charles
G. Boyd, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command.
"Then it was air strikes on Serbian
forces around Gorazde, then the same for the Bihac enclave. The
problem then and later was that the Muslims had figured out very
well how to use UN "safe havens" as safe springboards for
offensive operations out of Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Bihac
and, later, Tuzla. This was clearly not the Security Council's
intent in creating the safe havens for Bosnian civilians, but that
was the practical effect."
"THOUGHTS ON UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA"
The South Slav Journal, v. 16, No. 61-62,
Autumn-Winter 1995, by David Binder, former NYT Editor
and Balkan specialist
"An UNPROFOR deputy spokesman said in Belgrade Thursday that for the
one year he had been with the peace mission Croatia's attack on
Serb Krajina was the most terrible event.
Chris Gunness, who was leaving the U.N. mission, described the reaction by the
international community to Croatia's attack on Western Slavonia as
disappointing.
He said U.N. personnel were isolated and frustrated for being unable to
protect the Serbs during the attack in May 1995 on the U.N. Protected
Area - Sector West.
A mild response from the international community, he noted, prompted
Croatia to apply more of the same against U.N. - Protected Areas - Sector
North and Sector South - in August 1995. He said this action could
only be described as ethnic cleansing, which, he said, was terrible and a
big evil."
From TANJUG wire service, January 18, 1995.
"In the face what U.N. observers in Croatia call the largest instance of
ethnic cleansing in the entire Balkan wars, where were the moralist who
for years have been so loudly decrying the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian
Muslims. Where were the cries for block the demand for arms, the call to
action on behalf of today a pitiful victims. There were the columnists, the
senators, the other posturors who excoriate the West for standing by
when Bosnian Muslims are victimised and are silent when the victim of
the day is Serb?"
"ETHNIC CLEANSING THAT'S CONVENIENT"
Editorial in the Washington Post, August 1995,
the week of Croatian invasion of Krajina, by Charles Krauthammer
"We also saw, at the end of September, public acknowledgement that
the Croatian offensive to 'ethnically cleanse' the Krajina
area of Croatia of Croatian Serbs who had been living there for
centuries, had resulted in the deaths and torture of many civilians,
and the forceable displacement of a quarter-million people from
their homes."
"LIES AND DIPLOMACY"
Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, London,
October 1995, by Gregory Copley
"In October, the Fifth Corps launched an offensive out of the
U.N.-designated "safe area" of Bihac, cutting a swath through
Serbian territory around the enclave. The safe zone of Bihac was
used as a staging area for attacks against Serb populated areas
on the Grabez plateau, leading to the expulsion of about 10,000
Serbs, who escaped to neighboring Serb-held Croatia, following
the tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims who had fled the earlier
Bosnian Fifth Corps offensive.
The Bihac offensives were not exceptional. Elsewhere, Bosnian
government troops joined forces with the Croats to take the town
of Kupres from the Serbs. They also engaged the Serbs around
Trnovo, Tuzla, Mostar and Sarajevo. The cease-fire in Sarajevo
was broken by government soldiers, who repeatedly entered the
demilitarized zone and launched attacks against the Serbs."
"POLICY WITHOUT PRINCIPLE"
The Nation, January 30 1996, by Joan Hoey
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