Serb nationalism broke up Yugoslavia.

There is much reason to believe that the abrupt and poorly controlled Serbian national awakening, presided over by Slobodan Milosevic in the years just prior to 1991, contributed to the rise of ethnic hatred that was later to errupt in Yugoslavia. But rival nationalisms were already quite active and organized by then, particularly in the secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia. The key to Yugoslavia's destruction was their decision (followed later by Bosnia-Herzegovina) to unilaterally break away, coupled with Western passivity regarding Germany's drive to legitimize this dismemberment before the key issues of state succession, new borders and minority rights have been mutually settled.

1991, Belgrade, Yugoslavia Secretary of State, James Baker,
with Milan Kucan, Republic of Slovenia,
Franjo Tudjman, Republic of Croatia,
and Alija Izetbegovic, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

"In the face of mounting divisive tensions, [Yugoslavia's] death knell was sounded in December 1991 when Germany pressured the other members of the European Community into an agreement to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia."

"There is, however, general agreement that the onset of violence that has emerged can be traced to the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia on 25 June 1991. Only four days earlier, their leaders had assured the American secretary of state that they would not act unilaterally. [...] The Croats have been fighting not for democracy, but for a free Croatia, while the Federal Army and the Serbs have been battling not for communism but for restoration of the former Yugoslavia [...]."

"Brushing aside both the secretary-general and the chairman of the Hague Conference, as well as pleaas from the highest levels of the American government, the German foreign minister [...] pressured the EC into recognizing Croatia and Slovenia."

"The German action and EC acquiescence have raised important legal problems. Under the international law, only internationally established borders are inviolable and cannot be changed by force. The legal status of internal borders is an entirely different matter: for example, the border between California and Oregon is not subject to international law. The present internal lborders of Yugoslavia were drawn by Tito in 1945. Croatia and Slovenia were never independent countries with internationally recognized boundaries."

"The Germans say that their action hastened the peace process. In reality, the opposite is true."

1991, Belgrade, Yugoslavia Secretary of State, James Baker,
with Kiro Gligorov, Republic of Macedonia,
and Slobodan Milosevic, Republic of Serbia

"All factions in the former Yugoslavia have pursued the same objective avoiding minority status in Yugoslavia or any successor state -- and all have used the tools most readily available to achieve that end."

"What is frequently referred to as rampant Serb nationalism and the creation of a greater Serbia has often been the same volatile mixture of fear, opportunism, and historical myopia that seems to motivate patriots everywhere in the Balkans."

"In the cases of Croatia and Bosnia, as well as Slovenia and Macedonia, Western nations suffered a temporary lapse in their concern over borders, accepting the dissolution of a U.N. member nation in favor of self-determination. That policy [...] led to catastrophic destabilization where the will of the population was most ambiguous -- ethnically mixed Bosnia. One-third of Bosnia's population boycotted the referendum on independence and made it unmistakably clear that it would take up arms if the new state was created and recognized."

"Few have noted that in 1992, Baker literally created the supposedly independent and supposedly sovereign Bosnia and Hercegovina with its Muslim president, Alija Izetbegovic, thereby provoking Europe's first protracted war since 1945. He did so with the blessing of President Bush and with considerable input from Larry Eagleburger and Warren Zimmermann - past and contemporary ambassadors to Belgrade. Their design was both complex and devious, but they were so convinced of its efficacy that they supported Izetbegovic in his rejection of the European Community's Lisbon plan for dividing Bosnia and Hercegovina in a federative scheme."

"The assumption, moreover, that the war has been one of Serbian aggression has been generally accepted in the United States; the debate over intervention has not fundamentally turned over the existence of aggression against an internationally recognized state, but over the potential costs of U.S. military action to reverse it.

The validity of this widespread consensus rests primarily on the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina gained recognition as an independent state in early April 1992, and that all subsequent support which Belgrade provided to the Bosnian Serbs constituted an illegal intervention in Bosnia's internal affairs. Yet the manner in which independence was achieved and the manner in which recognition was accorded were themselves highly questionable. In holding a referendum on March 1, 1992, in which a majority voted to secede from Yugoslavia, Bosnia satisfied part of the criteria laid down by the European Community and the United States for achieving recognition (with the West also exacting from the Sarajevo government a declared respect for minority rights), but the referendum, boycotted by the Serbs, was itself a violation of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution- That constitution, like its predecessors, had conferred a right of secession but made it dependent on the mutual agreement of the nationS composing Yugoslavia. It was based, that is to say, on the notion of a conCurrent majority of the constituent nationS, not on simple majoritarianism; to move to secession without the consent of the Serbs was a plain violation of its terms.

If the act of secession was illegal within the terms of the Yugoslav constitution, was it nevertheless legal from the standpoint of international law? Is it now, in other words, an accepted principle of international law that a majority of the population within a well defined province or constituent republic, if it so wishes, has a right to secede from an existing state? There is little to conclude that there is. No charter, treaty, or convention confers such a right, and for the reason that a great many states (and nearly all those of a multi-ethnic or -religious kind) would be incapable of maintaining themselves if such a right existed. References to the right of self-determination in documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have not been understood as conferring a right of secession. Were the case otherwise, we would have the inexplicable phenomenon that a large number of states had entered a suicide pact when they signed the covenant, and no known rule of legal interpretation would allow such an absurd construction.

These considerations establish that the recognition of Bosnia's independence itself constituted an illegal intervention in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, to which Belgrade had every right to object"