American Interests
A weak Serbia is in the best interest of the US and peace in general.
Serb defiance of the UN, NATO and the US has been largely a reaction to
what they saw as gross unfairness in the treatment of their just cause.
While highly publicized, it was fundamentally less disturbing than the
disrespect for these institutions shown by Muslim and Croat leaders.
Despite some ostensible short-term advantages, no reliance on a
pro-fundamentalist Bosnia or pro-fascist Croatia can be the basis of a
long-term, principled US policy in Southeastern Europe. Times do change,
but the history of 20th century American alliances in this area amply
underscores this point. The dominant nation in northern Balkans (along
with Greeks in the south), Serbs have been and remain a factor of
stability in the region, and addressing their legitimate national
concerns is in America's best interest.
"If we are to examine the revival of Fascism and Islamic fanaticism
against which they are fighting, it may be rightfully said that
Serbs are the ones and not the Bosnians, who are fighting our
battle."
"SERBIAN BATTLE FOR AMERICA"
Philadelphia Inquirer, 1995,
by Philip Jenkins
"To be evenhanded, Washington should have treated in a procedurally equal way all the factions' claims to self-determination. It goes beyond a
consideration of power balances. American interests, as I understand
them, flow from our philosophical support for local political
legitimacy; we should not be in the business of imposing arbitrary
solutions from above."
"STEERING CLEAR OF BALKAN SHOALS"
The Nation, January 8/15, 1996,
by George Kenney,
a foreign policy consultant and former State Department official
"The United States should become involved militarily
only if a conflict threatens to produce a would-be hegemonic power that could
pose a credible threat to the security and well-being of the American people .
The careless, promiscuous use of the 1930s analogy blurs that important
distinction and would have the United States intervening in a murky civil war
that has only the most tenuous connection to American interests."
"THE BALKAN CRISIS AND THE FAULTY 1930s ANALOGY"
Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 5, Num. 4, Fall 1994,
by Ted Galen Carpenter,
director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and
author of "A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War".
"Although he was distinctly no friend of Milosevic, [former Croatian Deputy Prime Minister] Mate Babic admitted frankly that Serbia had gone further down the road of privatization than Croatia. Tudjman, he insisted, was consciously blocking Croatia's progress in this direction. Let it be remembered that according to President Tudjman, Croatia's moral superiority over Serbia lay in its fervent commitment to free-market economics."
"THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA"
Penguin Books, 1992,
by Misha Glenny,
veteran BBC Eastern Europe and Balkan correspondent,
currently a fellow at the Wilson Center
"[...] There is, however, general agreement that the onset of violence that has emerged can be traced to the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia on 25 June 1991. Only four days earlier, their leaders had assured the American secretary of state that they would not act unilaterally. Not surprisingly, he regarded their reneging as devious treatment."
"THE LIFE AND DEATH OF INTEGRATION IN YUGOSLAVIA"
Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 3, Num. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 34-43,
by Walter Roberts,
retired foreign service officer formerly stationed in Yugoslavia,
and diplomat-in-residence at the Elliot School of International Affairs,
George Washington University.
"Bosniac ties to radical Islam should not be lightly dismissed. The
Bosnian government enjoys closer cooperation with Iran than it
would readily admit and takes great pains to preclude curiosity
seekers (including UNPROFOR) from observing their partner's embassy
in Sarajevo. [...]
Approximately 4000 Mujahedin, supported by Iranian special
operations forces, have been continually intensifying their
activities in central Bosnia for more than two years. [...]
The potential for this
organization to escalate its activities remains high and could
threaten regional stability despite any future agreements.
Funding for the Mujahedin has been provided by Iran and various
other Islamic states with an interest in expanding extremism into
Europe. International radical groups, such as Hizbollah, have also
been included on the suspected list of sponsors. Bosnian government
sources only grudgingly acknowledge the presence of the Mujahedin
but publicly intimate that they have accepted their presence as a
'necessary evil' to maintain the flow of aid from international
Islamic contributors. This 'aid' has been distributed in forms
ranging from hard currency to clandestine arms shipments. As time
progresses, these professional 'holy warriors' will likely divert
their attention to politicizing the Muslim population and
attempting to establish an Islamic republic obedient to
fundamentalist doctrine."
"SELLING THE BOSNIAN MYTH TO AMERICA: BUYER BEWARE"
The Foreign Military Studies Office, October 1995,
by Lt. Colonel John Sray,
a U.S. Army Military
Intelligence and Russian Foreign Area Officer
who served a six-month tour in Sarajevo
as Chief of the G-2 section for the UN command in Bosnia
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