Balkan Repository Project

Veljko Vujacic

Cleveland City Club, May 7, 1999.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honor for me to speak to the Cleveland City Club Forum, an institution which has served as a bulwark of free speech in this country since 1912 and which has hosted many distinguished speakers in the past, including the President of the United States. It is not every day that a sociology professor, even if one who has the luck of teaching at one of America¹s most distinguished liberal arts institutions--Oberlin College--has the opportunity to advance his views on a topic of great public importance and interest in front of such an August forum. Today¹s topic has become sadly familiar to all of us: as I speak NATO¹s bombing campaign over Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo is laying to waste to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while the tragic plight of Albanian refugees is there for all to see. The war rages with great intensity both from the air and on the ground, and the solution to the conflict is not yet in sight.

I find myself in the awkward position of watching my adopted country--the United States--engaged in a bombing campaign against my country of origin, Serbia and Yugoslavia. My whole family and many of my friends are in Yugoslavia, from Belgrade to Novi Sad, and Montenegro. Perhaps I can still console myself with the thought that, as far as I know, they are all still alive, while being fully aware that many other families cannot say the same of their own. More awkwardly still, I find myself in the unfortunate position of someone who was trained largely in the American educational system and has adopted many of the cherished values of this country--first and foremost the values of liberalism, free speech, democracy, and respect for individual rights--while watching the Western countries using military means to ³defend these values² in the troubled Balkan region. Finally, I find myself in the position of being called to speak about the Balkans as a specialist on the region, as someone who has devoted ten years of his life to understanding what has transpired in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, and especially in Serbia and Russia. So that now, in this short time available to me, I have to attempt to reconcile my roles as a son, brother, cousin, friend, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States, a political liberal who wishes to see democracy and prosperity triumph in the Balkans and elsewhere, and a sociologist and specialist on the region who must examine what is transpiring in as dispassionate a manner as is possible under the current circumstances. I hope you will appreciate the difficulty of this task.

A great German sociologist, Max Weber, who struggled all his life to reconcile two incompatible roles--that of a passionate social scientist with an equally passionate commitment to citizenship and politics--once stated that ³of all the types of prophecy....the professorial type of prophecy is the only one which is altogether repugnant.² Instead of being a boring preacher or, worse still, an unsuccessful prophet, Weber argued, the social scientist must separate his private opinions, the opinions of a citizen, from what he proposes to discuss under the heading of science. Science, he held, cannot tell us what to do or how to live but can only make us aware about the best means to achieve our goals, the goals themselves determined by our subjectively held values. It is the duty of a citizen to fight for his values with all the means he considers to be appropriate; it is duty of the social scientist to inform the citizen about the least costly and best possible means to achieve these values given the various social, cultural, and political constraints which might stand in the way of their realization in practice. From the point of view of this rather ascetic ethic, it is the duty of the professor-- even if such a modest one as myself--to make the citizen aware of unpleasant, ³personally uncomfortable facts and to distinguish them from his own evaluations.² This is exactly what I propose to do in the short time available to me.

Let me then say that, as a liberal and citizen who holds dear the values of freedom and individual rights, I am deeply moved by the tragedy which is occurring in Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as in the neighboring countries of Albania and Macedonia. A disproportionate amount of suffering has been born by the inhabitants of Kosovo, mostly Albanian, but also those of other nationalities who live there and all over Yugoslavia--first and foremost the Serbs and Montenegrins. But war and death are great equalizers--they do not spare anyone, including the large Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, or the Croats, Muslims, Jews, Slovaks, Gypsies, Turks, and other minorities who still live in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this sense, the war effort is not directed against the Serbs and Serbia only, but against all the inhabitants of Yugoslavia--all those who were, are, or might become ³collateral damage,² whether from aerial bombardment, fighting on the ground, because they are forced to flee, or simply because they are unable to bear what is happening all around them.

It is a tempting, comfortable, as well as a patronizing Enlightenment assumption that the responsibility for this tragic conflict lies solely with evil and cynical leaders, while the innocent masses are merely manipulated civilians, who had nothing to do with the carnage. Seduced by propaganda of the media controlled by their leaders, masses of Yugoslavs, one version of the argument goes, became convinced that their sole chance of survival lay in the politics of preemptive war--lest they be exterminated by members of the other ethnic group. One the one hand evil, monstrous leaders; on the other, the seduced masses of innocent citizens who would do otherwise only if they saw the light of reason.

But this assumption, however consoling it might be to a Western audience deeply convinced that people will be good only if they are enlightened about their true interests, cannot bear a careful examination of the facts. Leaders can manipulate, cajole, threaten: but no one can produce a war out of thin air, and leaders, including those with the worst intentions have to build on genuine grievances, however distorted the prism through which these grievances might be presented. This is true of all conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, including the one between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.

Historically, Kosovo is the place where modern secular Serbian and Albanian nationalism clashed since the late nineteenth century. For Serbs Kosovo is their holy land, their Jerusalem, the site their glorious medieval kingdom, the patriarchy of Pec and hundreds of churches and monasteries. It is also the site of the famous Field of Blackbirds (Kosovo Polje) battle, in which Serbian Tsar Lazar and his nobility lost ground to the invading Ottoman forces. Successive generations of orthodox Christian Serbs turned this defeat on the field of battle into a spiritual victory for Christianity; for, according to the legend, when faced with the excruciating choice, Serbian Tsar Lazar chose the Kingdom in Heaven over the one on Earth, even if simultaneously one of his nobles, Milos Obilic, proceeded to take the life of his opponent, the great Sultan Murat in an act of earthly retribution. This connection between the two themes of Christian martyrdom and patriarchal revenge was henceforth passed on from generation to generation through epic poems, forming the basis of the defining myth of nineteenth-century Serbian nationalism. An integral part of the Kosovo myth was the story of the betrayal of Tsar Lazar by one of his nobles, Vuk Brankovic. For six centuries, his name has been inscribed into the Serbian national memory as a symbol of cowardice and treason. It is not for nothing that one Serbian epic from the Kosovo cycle says:

"Whoever will not fight at Kosovo
may nothing grow that his hand sows,
neither the white wheat in his field,
nor the vine of grapes on his mountain."

To a Western audience it might seem odd that a six-century old curse might hold a powerful hold on the mind of a people; but that it still does is proven by the fact that no Serbian politician, however tolerant and liberal, would want to be associated with the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and Yugoslavia; and I am sure that none of us here would like to be inscribed the national consciousness of our peoples as those who have trampled on the holy ground of our nations.

For Albanians, on the other hand, Kosovo is not only a territory in which they today constitute a local majority but in which Albanians have lived from ancient times as the indigenous, Illyrian, non-Slavic population of the Balkan peninsula. Kosovo, however, is also the birthplace of modern secular Albanian nationalism. Beginning with the League of Prizren in 1878, Albanian nationalists have laid claim to the territory of Kosovo which, in their eyes, should become an integral part of a greater Albanian state. These nationalists were bitterly disappointed with the outcome of the First Balkan War of 1912 in which Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and Greeks united in a common struggle against the Ottoman empire. As a result of that war Kosovo was attached to Serbia and many Serbs were ecstatic about this successful reconquista: the holy ground of Kosovo, the center of their medieval state, had returned, once and for all, to its rightful owner. The Kosovo myth was consumed, the Kosovo heroes vindicated.

Despite the fact that 1912 was the year which witnessed the formation of Albania as an independent state--a process carried out with the help of the Austro-Hungarian empire which sought to thwart Serbian expansion in the south--many Albanians felt cheated by the great powers. Just the other day, on CNN perspectives, we had the opportunity to see Jakup Krasniqi, the spokesman for the Kosovo Liberation Army, saying to his soldiers that the international community must correct the mistakes which the great powers had made in 1912 when they attached Kosovo to Serbia. He did not fail to add that Kosovo has ³belonged to Albanians² for the last two thousand years. There is no reason not to believe in his sincerity, just as in that of the Serbs who feel that the holy land of Kosovo should rightfully belong to them.

The turbulent twentieth century has witnessed many reversals of ethnic fortune in the Balkans, with power shifting from one to another group, not the least between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. On both sides, painful historical memories were reinforced by a constant process of power and status-reversal and conflict over a shared territory. This never-ending cycle of status- reversal can be briefly summarized as follows: Moslem (not Catholic or Orthodox) Albanians were the privileged group under the Ottoman empire (at least relative to Orthodox Serbs); Serbs "came out on top" after the Balkan wars (1912-1913) and the formation of Yugoslavia (1918); the status/power relationship changed in World War Two when a large part of Kosovo became a part of "greater Albania" under the sponsorship of Mussolini¹s Italy; in 1945, the Serbs "took over," albeit under the auspices of communist Yugoslavia and in the name of "brotherhood and unity;" after Kosovo became a fully autonomous province (1974), high Albanian birth rates and the gradual "Albanianization" of the local Communist party once more raised the painful specter of status-reversal (for Serbs); with the advent of Milo_evi_ to power, Serbs emerged as the dominant status group for the third time in this century. In each of these cases, the process of status-reversal was accompanied by a revival of unpleasant memories as well as actual instances of persecution which further reinforced them.

More immediately, the roots of the current conflict date back to the 1960's when the decentralization of the Yugoslav state led to the gradual extension of the autonomy to Kosovo. Nominally a part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina practically gained the status of federal republics after the adoption of the 1974 constitution. The prospect of the "confederalization" of the republic of Serbia was an object of criticism by Serbian intellectuals already in the early 1970's who warned that any further decentralization of Serbia and Yugoslavia could lead to the disintegration of the state with tragic consequences both for the Serbs and for other nationalities. The reward for their courage in speaking out on the constitutional question in Tito¹s Yugoslavia were prison terms and dismissal from the university of Belgrade.

By the early-1980's, national conflict in Kosovo assumed critical proportions, with Albanian riots and demands for full republican status threatening not only the fragile inter-ethnic balance of the weakened federal system, but the integrity of the Yugoslav state as well. This political threat was accompanied by a perceived "ethno-demographic threat," caused by high Albanian birth rates and Serbian immigration from the region. While the process of Serbian immigration from Kosovo began already in the 1960's, the cumulative effects of demographic change were felt only by the mid-1980's when the proportion of Serbs and Montenegrins fell to little more than 10% of the region's total population. While the causes of migration varied, many Serbs complained of being driven from the land by Albanians, with the local police forces and courts unable or unwilling to address their grievances. At the same time, scores of Albanian activists ended with long prison sentences for advocating either the secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia or the granting of full republican status to the province--a step which many Yugoslav officials saw as a first step to independence. As you can see, the problem of Kosovo has a long history in the twentieth century; it did not originate with the advent of the Milosevic regime ten years ago.

It is a familiar lesson of history that weak institutions breed strong leaders: and it is hardly an accident that Serbia's President Slobodan Milo_evi_ made his first populist breakthrough among the Kosovo Serbs, playing on the very same grievances which the federal state failed to address. In 1989 he reversed the autonomous status of Kosovo, abolishing or rendering illegal many local Albanian institutions which were seen as a hotbed of secessionist sentiment. This attempt at reintegrating Kosovo into Serbia failed, provoking great resentment among local Albanians, most of whom ceased to recognize Serbia as their state; this is proven by the fact that Albanians did not take part in any Serbian multiparty election, although with their large numbers, they could have done much to further the course of the democratization of Serbia in tandem with Serbia's own democratic parties. Instead, their leaders decided to create a parallel ethnic society in Kosovo in defiance not only of the present Serbian regime, but of the Serbian state as well. Until 1996 and 1997, the undisputed leader of the Kosovo Albanians was Ibrahim Rugova, a brave man who consistently sought a peaceful solution to the problem, commanding undisputed authority and respect among the local Albanian population. But then, disappointed with the fact that the Albanian problem was not addressed at the Dayton negotiations which brought peace to Bosnia, radical Albanian groups began organizing an armed uprising. We see most of them today in the ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army--a group which had not shied away from using all available means in order to achieve its ultimate goal--an independent Kosovo separate from Serbia and Yugoslavia.

It has been repeatedly stated by the officials of the present administration that President Milosevic¹s brutal reprisals which did not spare civilians even prior to the outbreak of the present war, served to bolster the ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army, forcing many peaceful Albanian citizens of Kosovo to join its ranks; but it is never mentioned that the Kosovo Liberation Army¹s violent tactics were specifically designed to provoke such reprisals in the expectation of undercutting support for more moderate Albanian leaders in Kosovo, i.e. those who did not think that exposing one¹s own population to such reprisals was the best method to achieve their goal of autonomy and/or independence. This tactics has been, after all, characteristic of many secessionist movements, from the IRA to the Basque ETA, so it is rather difficult to fathom why the present United States administration and the leaders of the Western alliance decided to turn a blind eye to it.

Let me now return to the question posed by Max Weber: how adequate are the means used by the NATO countries in achieving their stated goals? How adequate have they been in protecting the Albanian minority from the Serbian forces, preventing all-out ethnic war, paving the way for future reconciliation and democracy?

The professed goal of the current policy has been to overcome the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. Prior to the bombing campaign, there were about 2000 victims of the conflict and as many as 200,000 internally displaced people in Kosovo, predominantly Albanian. After the removal of international observers from the ground and the bombing, more than 700,000 refugees in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, tens of thousands in Serbia itself, with the number of internally displaced and dead still unknown. The professed goal of the current policy: to prevent the escalation of war by paralyzing the forces of the Yugoslav army and police. The result: a conflagration of the whole Kosovo region, an all out ethnic war between Yugoslav forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army which is still operating in Kosovo, and the victimization of many civilians. The professed goal of the present policy: to weaken the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. The result: a strengthening of the Serbian regime as a natural side effect of the bombing campaign, the common phenomenon of people rallying around the flag in times of war, regardless of who is at the helm; consequently, the weakening of democratic forces in Serbia which find themselves squeezed between their ideological friends--the Western democracies--and their loyalty to the Serbian nation, if not the present regime. The professed goal of the policy: the strengthening of democratic forces in Montenegro led by President Djukanovic. The result: a weakening of democratic forces in Montenegro, and the not too unlikely prospect of civil war between the supporters of President Djukanovic and those of President Milosevic. The professed goal of the current policy: a greater stability for the whole Balkan region. The result: greater instability in Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, and Greece, not to mention Kosovo and Serbia. The stated goal: the creation of a multicultural Kosovo in which Serbs and Albanians can live together. The result: a complete breakdown of trust between Serbs and Albanians, and the rise of extremism in both camps. The result: Serbs see most if not all Albanians as a hostile minority which provoked foreign intervention with the goal of dismembering their state; the Albanians see all Serbs as butchers of their people. On both sides, volunteers are rushing for arms. The result: the elimination of the distinction between president Milosevic and the Serbian people, and the elimination of the distinction between Albanians and the Kosovo Liberation Army. In other words, few Serbs have any other choice but to support president Milosevic and few if any Albanians can support anyone else than the Kosovo Liberation Army. The professed goal of the present policy: to target the regime of President Milosevic while sparing the Serbian people. The outcome: an ever great number of mistakes which result in the death of civilians, angering the Serbian people and strengthening their resolve to fight foreign aggression. The stated goal of the policy: to advance the cause of liberal democracy in the region. The result: a hitherto inconceivable degree of hatred for the West in Serbian society, and the serious questioning of the methods used to advance the liberal cause in many surrounding countries, from Italy to Hungary and Greece, regardless of their official proclamations of loyalty to the cause of NATO, not to speak of the rise of anti- American feelings in Russia.

Let us now examine the potential effects of this policy on the proclaimed goal of bringing greater stability to Europe and by extension, the world community of nations. One of the founding principles of the world community of nations established after World War Two has been the principle of state sovereignty. But the current policy represents a blatant violation of the principles of state sovereignty and international law, a sidestepping of the UN Security Council and the United Nations. In addition, it constitutes a violation of the NATO charter, paving the way for interventionist policies elsewhere. The likely result: an increased potential for the escalation of the demands of minorities, and especially those extremist factions which might conclude that confrontation with the central state might bring unexpected benefits if not immediately than in the near future. The result: uncertainty about the true intentions of the West in Russia, Ukraine, China, and India--all large countries with significant minority problems.

I am fully aware that the principles of justice often stand in a tension with those of legal procedure, and that law can be violated under the exceptional circumstance when the cause of justice must be served. Yet, there is a good reason why the Western democracies are based on the idea of the rule of law: legal procedure stands in the way of the abuse of state power and safeguards the rights of citizens. The rule of law is a long- standing and glorious Western tradition that dates back to Roman times; further transformed in medieval canon law and the institution of the feudal contract, it culminated in the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. It is thanks to this tradition that the noble ideas of self-government and democracy have withstood the test of time, winning their battles against totalitarian fascism and communism. It hardly sets a good precedent and example to others, especially the fledgling democracies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, when the Western democracies themselves violate the very principles which stand at the foundation of their existence.

The peace negotiations in Paris and Rambouillet offer another illustration of the violation of these principles. As is well known, the first peace proposal was rejected by both parties, both the Serbian and Albanian delegations. Then one party was offered a carrot, the other a stick: the Albanian delegation was promised that a referendum on the final status of Kosovo will be carried out after a three year period during which Albanian autonomy would be guaranteed by an armed force from NATO countries; the other party was offered to sign a contract which would lead to the gradual dismemberment of its state or, alternatively, face punitive bombing. In addition, the first party was promised that NATO would intervene against the second party if the latter refused to sign. This is the kind of contract that one makes with the Godfather: an offer you can¹t refuse. I think you can appreciate the distinction between this procedure and a contractual agreement which is signed by two parties of their own free will and because both have an interest in doing so.

Finally, let us examine the current policy from the point of view of its value consistency, that is its compatibility with our liberal values. The intervention in Yugoslavia has been carried out under the pretext of defending the lives of an ethnic minority persecuted by the state. Aside from its obvious practical failure, how has this policy been carried out? By cowardly bombing from the safe distance of 15,000 feet. Is it possible that the 19 countries which now make up NATO and represent the West are unwilling to sacrifice even one human life for the advancement of liberal values? Can it be that Western lives are more worthy of preservation than the lives of those human beings which have been endangered as a result of the conflict and the bombing, whether Albanians or Serbs? Is that the true meaning of the phrase that Œall men are born free and equal?¹ But liberalism is a universal ideology predicated on the assumption that all men have an equal right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: it allows no privileging of American and European lives over those of Albanians and Serbs. Sadly, we come to the conclusion that the current policy is not even consistent with our own values.

I can hear your objection. All these things might be true, you will say, but there is a single consideration of great importance which justifies the present intervention: the character of the present Serbian regime and its intention to carry out a genocide against the Albanian population. In this view the Serbian regime is comparable to Nazi Germany. Let me remind you that Nazi Germany was a state which exterminated six million Jews wherever they could be found, from France to Russia and Ukraine, and with no threat whatsoever posed by the Jewish people to the German state. Let me remind you that Nazi Germany was a state with the ambition of ruling the whole world in the name of the impersonal ideology of the master race, carrying out for these purposes a policy of eugenics on the basis of an ugly variant of Social Darwinism; let me remind you that Nazi Germany was an aggressive power which did not satisfy itself with defending its own territory, but sought to subdue the whole European continent and possibly the whole world; finally, let me remind you that among all the Yugoslav peoples, the Serbian and Montenegrin people were the first to rise against Nazi Germany, rejecting the Tripartite pact which their government had signed in 1941, courageously fighting for the allied cause against overwhelming odds. But all this, you might say, might have no bearing whatsoever on the present.

Then let me pose the following question for your consideration: if the Serbian regime was bent on genocide against Albanians, how come it did not carry this genocide before the Kosovo Liberation Army could stand in the way of its sinister goals? Why, during the last nine years of war no such genocide was attempted? And, secondly, if our administration knew about the true intentions of the Serbian regime well in advance, why did its representatives find it fit to negotiate with a genocidal regime, thus giving it time to carry out its hidden plans? In reality, there were atrocities and one documented large massacre of Albanian civilians, but no documented intention of genocide or evidence thereof. Retrospective imputations of such a motive simply do not hold ground. Finally, may I also be permitted to remind you that in the course of the last year, more than 200 Serbian and Albanians civilians had been kidnaped by the Kosovo Liberation Army, in many instances disappearing without a trace, and that the Yugoslav army and police were the constant target of KLA fighters? On the same CNN perspectives documentary which featured the spokesman of the KLA, we saw a Serbian peasant from Kosovo defending his village against KLA fighters in the Drenica region last fall. There was no police or army around, just a man whose son was kidnaped and who took a gun to defend his village; he claimed to have been a good neighbor who built a road to a nearby Albanian village with his own hands, so that all could benefit, Serbs and Albanians. Was that also the face of a Nazi fanatic?

Let us now ask the question: is it not true that we had a comparable situation in Croatia and Bosnia, and we did nothing to stop it? How could we trust the current Serbian regime which violated so many of its promises? This is indeed a difficult question. And yet the answer might as well be provided by the present administration which has elevated those most responsible for the wars in Croatia and Bosnia to the status of peacemakers, the signatories of Dayton. True enough, even that agreement was rendered possible by the presence of armed troops from NATO countries; but it has also held because the parties were exhausted by a three-year war and had a concrete interest in upholding the peace with the help of the international community. At that time, although militarily defeated, the Bosnian Serbs were offered a positive incentive to sign the peace--their own republic within the larger Bosnian state; no such incentive was given now. Finally, let us pose the question: if the present administration did not trust the Serbian regime, was it correct in trusting the Kosovo Liberation Army? Has this force suddenly become democratic? Did this miraculous transformation happen overnight, after one meeting with the representatives of the National Endowment for Democracy? And why was nothing done to restrain its activity in Kosovo?

Let me now return to the Nazi comparison. Despite all the horrible and ugly acts perpetrated by the Serbian paramilitaries, police and army forces in Croatia and Bosnia, and despite the ethnic cleansing that occurred, it was never the aim of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia to exterminate Croats and Bosnian Moslems. Nor was it their aim to create a master race in the Balkans, nor even to control all of Bosnia, but only a part of its territory. Let me remind you that these Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia formed the bulk of Partisan units during the first stages of WWII, precisely because they themselves were the object of the most brutal, indeed genocidal policies of the collaborationist Ustashe regime in the Independent State of Croatia which incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. Let me also remind you that the present Croatian regime led by president, Franjo Tudjman, did its best to evoke their memories of the ugly WWII past. And yet, Tudjman¹s regime was endorsed by the Western powers, however reluctantly at first; more than that, this regime was allowed to carry out the large-scale ethnic cleansing of several hundred thousand Serbs from Croatia and Western Bosnia in a mere four days, and in front of the eyes of the whole Western community of nations. Why was their no reaction then?

All this is not an attempt to justify the atrocities committed by Serbian forces in Croatia and Bosnia, but it does serve as a reminder that the international community did not find it appropriate to address or understand their fears, and this despite the fact that Serbs constituted a 12% minority in Croatia, and 32% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina? The following question then logically comes to mind: if the 32% of Serbs in Bosnia were not allowed to pursue the cause of their self- determination, why should the same right be extended to the 14% Albanian minority in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? If the international community did not want to endorse either the formation of a greater Serbia or a greater Croatia, why endorse de facto if not de iure a greater Albania?

What about Serbia itself? Is it a Nazi state? Despite the authoritarian character of the present regime, pluralism continued to exist in Serbian political life. Throughout the whole war, opposition parties continued to oppose the policies of the Serbian regime, winning a considerable portion of the popular vote. Only two years ago, hundreds of thousands of Serbian citizens courageously demonstrated for liberalism and democracy, waving British, American, and French flags on the streets of Belgrade and many provincial cities as well. This was not the first time. Were these the faces of Nazi fanatics? Did the members of the Hitlerjugend wave American flags in the streets of Berlin? Did they shout "Berlin is the world" on a par with the Serbian students who carried the slogan "Belgrade is the world?" Were there any Nazi cosmopolitans? Did they call on president Roosevelt to help them establish a democratic regime in Germany? No, these Belgrade faces were not the faces of Nazis, but of eighteen and nineteen year-old Serbian students who were only thirteen or fourteen years old when the war in Yugoslavia began and who courageously protested for 88 days in the longest peaceful civic march in any East European country since 1989. These were the faces of middle-aged intellectuals, the best years of their lives and careers wasted, of workers without wages, civil servants without salaries, of women tired of sending their men to war, grandmothers rejoicing at the spectacle of engaged youth. Urbane, intelligent faces, faces which mocked the stupidity and narrow- mindedness of the politics of hatred. Where, one may ask, was the Western community of nations then? What are these people thinking about Western values now? Can they be expected to trust the West ever again? Do they have any hope that change will ever occur? Will they perish in the new battle of Kosovo?

I do not wish to be wrongly understood. It has often been remarked that Serbs have complied with the policies carried out in the name of their nation and that even if they have not been guilty of crimes themselves, that they have lacked any capacity for self-criticism. This is partially true, but it is far from the whole truth. For the last nine years, many Serbs, even if a minority, have courageously opposed the war, writing and acting on the basis of their belief in the value of individual life and human rights. Many did so passively: feeling that the war was not their own, they avoided the draft, seeking refuge elsewhere; but others stayed and continued to fight for democracy in a society devastated by war, isolated from the international community by economic sanctions, feeling that they were collectively stigmatized as war criminals and murderers by the Western media, accused for crimes they have neither perpetrated nor condoned. I have brought here a book to show you, a book misleadingly entitled The Serbian Side of the War. It is an 800-page volume published in Belgrade in 1996, containing about 30 contributions, all but three of them written by intellectuals from Serbia, all of them examining the responsibility of various Serbian and Yugoslav institutions for the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Many others asked and examined the same questions on a regular basis in various media outlets and their editorial columns. Is that the face of Nazi Serbia?

Let me be clear. Regardless of all possible excuses, no human being, whether conservative, liberal, socialist, or indeed, nationalist, should try to justify mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, even under the extreme conditions of war. Even in wartime, it should be the duty of every patriotic citizen first and foremost army officers, to minimize attacks on civilians, and contain the kind of politics of hatred which targets civilians not because they are implicated in military action or support for a guerilla force, but solely because they are the members of another ethnic group. That is inexcusable. Therefore, as a citizen, not a social scientist, I stand here and say to you: I condemn the policy of ethnic cleansing and I am personally ready to extend my hand of friendship and reconciliation to any Croat, Bosnian Muslim, and Albanian who has been target of indiscriminate persecution on the part of Serbian forces. I am ready to do so although I have neither perpetrated any crime nor condoned it. But I will not extend my hand of friendship to any Croat, Bosnian Muslim, and Albanian who has endorsed violence as a means of achieving their own narrow political goal of national independence, in disregard of the possible consequences for others or their own people.

I will not do this because all these extremists have been driven by the same logic and the same ethic, the ethic which Max Weber described as the ethic of absolute ends. The essence of this ethic is best captured by the Latin proverb ³Fiat iustitia, pereas mundi!² (May justice prevail even if the world perishes!). In other words, the ultimate goal must be realized whatever the means necessary to achieve it and in disregard of the consequences. Sociologically speaking, this is the ethic of certain fanatical religious creeds and revolutionary movements, including extreme nationalist ones.

To this ethic, Max Weber contrasted the ethic of responsibility: an ethic which measures the morality of an action, especially a political action, by its likely consequences. This ethic, on the whole, has provided the foundation for the kind of liberal politics characteristic of Western democracies. Unlike science, argued Weber, politics is passionate, not dispassionate, driven by partisanship not by the ideal of objectivity. But passion is not enough: a responsible politician must act with a cool head, in full awareness of the possible consequences of his actions. Before he commits himself to a cause, the responsible politician must measure all the possible consequences of his actions, carefully weighing the relationship between means and ends, exploring the alternatives, and anticipating possible outcomes. Recently, we have seen plenty of passion among the Western leaders; but what we did not see was a cool head and a clear anticipation of the likely consequences of their actions. And, in the absence of a cool head, warned Weber, political passion turns into "sterile excitement."

Veljko Vujacic, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Oberlin College